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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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PARIS PAPER FAVOR DETERRENCE, TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEUTRON BOMB

Defense Strategy

Paris DEFENSE NOUVELLE in French 1 Jan 82 pp 2-3

[Editorial by Deodat Montbrun: "The 'Neutron' Bomb, Defensive Weapon"]

[Text] There is much talk about the neutron bomb, which is in fact an "enhanced radiation bomb"--that is to say, a "clean" bomb whose explosion is triggered by a tiny (if one can put it that way) fission bomb. We have said that the neutron bomb is a defensive weapon and Deodat Montbrun gives his opinion here. But some other threats that cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by that weapon are noted by George Berger [as published], who looks at one gap among many in the nation's defense system. G. Berger is an air warfare expert. As a captain he commanded and carried out one of the most daring parachute landing operations in the Mediterranean on the island of Crete. And he successfully carried out many others in the SAS [not further identified]. It is understandable that he thinks about the danger of a large-scale airlift operation of Soviet troops into Western Europe, an operation which, of course, would be supported by all the "pacifists" who are now trying to disarm our country.

The "Neutron" Bomb, Defensive Weapon

This is not a challenge that Reagan has thrown out to the Soviets. By ordering the so-called "N" bomb to be put into production, the American president has simply brought things into focus. Moscow's peace boasts and frauds are over. "They are making a big song and dance," Reagan has declared, "because we are preventing them from saying to Europe, 'Give yourselves up or you are dead.'" The Soviets, who had begun to suspect as much, are now convinced of it: they are stalled at the starting gate. The entire press has explained what the "bomb" is; we will not go back over that. Nor will we discuss the argument according to which it is a matter of a "dirty" weapon to be outlawed. First of all, what law?

And dirty? The weapon hits combatants, sparing women, children and old people. Even conscientious objectors who have buried themselves in a hole are protected!

What do people want? The sword and the dagger should have been made exceptions to the law that allowed one to strike only an armed opponent. For the communists to be able to put forward this chicanery without batting an eyelash, and to "prefer" the H-bomb--which burns, crushes, crumbles and destroys everything with blast and fire on top of its radiation, the aftereffects of which, moreover, are still killing people 30 years afterwards--shows how cynical they have become and the extent to which they take others for fools.

It seems to me that what is not emphasized enough with regard to this weapon is that one is talking about a defensive weapon, specifically for defense according to the very philosophy of and possibilities for its employment. It gives a defensive system, in a country that confines itself solely to its defense and in no way contemplates being an aggressor, an absolute superiority.

However, the Soviet military strategy's dominant theme is offense, brutal offense, with no notice, superpower style, using all known means and with the highest possible superiority in numbers.

The Soviets are prepared to use nuclear firepower to back up their attack. In its sanctuary, France will not have to respond; it is the FRG that would be affected. The Soviet Army will likewise use chemical warfare gas, including the most awful ones such as mustard gas, equipping its troops up to the battalion level. For their lowest-level leaders it is an everyday weapon, if I may be so bold as to say so. As for chemical weapons, they are the subject of the most thoughtful attention on the part of the Soviet Army's researchers, and its strategists seriously consider them. The end justifies the means. Destroying populations matters little to Moscow; on the contrary, the fewer people that remain the more its action will be facilitated. Likewise, suffering losses among the Soviet population matters little to the communist leaders, the important thing being that the leaders, the "party," remain. No conflict will kill as many as Stalin did. Consequently, for the Soviets and their agents in the world, the end result of the history of mankind is communism; everything must contribute to that. And it can only be realized on a worldwide scale; thus will all contradictions be wiped out. In short, in the view of Marxist ideology, since war is the global expression of the struggle of scientific systems, the other social system must be annihilated.

With this doctrine of destruction, assured on the one hand and accepted on the other, the USSR does not shrink from the risk of not succeeding. People must realize that; people must be convinced of that in order to tackle the problem of the defense of the free world. If the masters of the Kremlin have not acted it is because they are not certain--not 100 percent certain--of winning. If it were not for that uncertainty, we would long since not be asking the following question any more: "But what are they waiting for? Why such an arms race in a bloc so lacking in essential goods? Since that is quite evident, nobody contemplates attacking Russia, and who would allow somebody else to do so? Are the Soviets hesitating to take the plunge? Is their equipment less reliable than they want to admit? Are their armed forces, and particularly their navy, less reliable than they seem--or are their people less so?"

Certain observers study these parameters, but there is such disinformation, bluff and secrecy surrounding the USSR's war potential that the assessment of the West's experts cannot be confirmed. In this regard, the banning some time ago by Mr Thomas of the film ridiculing the Soviet Army may have been due to reasons other than those put forward by the broadcasting channel's new director. Mr Thomas announced that he wanted to be objective and fair. Let us hope, by the way, that everyone is equally objective and fair with respect to the French Army. And what if, on the other hand, Mr Thomas had seen a case for our demobilizing in the film on the Soviets? Faced with an army of Charlie Chaplins, it is, of course, pointless to worry about one's defense.

But things are more serious. Any defense determination on the part of the West demonstrated through firmness or through a determination to equip itself with a "stopper" weapon such as the "N" bomb reduces Soviet imperialism's possibilities for hegemony. Consequently, one understands Mr Brezhnev's reaction to Reagan's decision and, it must be admitted, to the sneaking interest that France, a nuclear power, shows in that weapon. One also understands, of course, the reactions of the PCF, whose religion is the victory of the communist order over the whole world.

This "neutron" bomb will guarantee peace. There is no question of abandoning the principle of deterrence, with or without ATN [Theater Nuclear Weapons], as far as we are concerned. Certainly not. But deterrence alone is not complete now. Its philosophy is outmoded; the Soviets know that. While deterrence is still necessary, it is insufficient, at any rate as far as Europe is concerned, and our worry is in that very regard. Let us bear in mind that "war in Europe could take place." The balance between the two blocs has been precarious for ages. Nobody knows what the U.S. reaction would be, faced with an indecisive Europe. The Soviets might very well accept the destruction that France could inflict on them, even if it were beyond being tolerable, in the event that they could be assured of not being subjected to U.S. missiles, since the latter are absolutely intolerable. All the more so since they would lead to the vitrification of the hemisphere. And, for us, defense solely through deterrence means that we would be prepared to strike first.

Should it be necessary to reach that stage?

Therefore, a good many big questions must be faced. Let us replace them with the "N" bomb.

Role in Stopping Air Attack

Paris DEFENSE NOUVELLE in French 1 Jan 82 pp 3-4

[Editorial by Georges Berge¹; "One Gap 'Among Many' in the Deterrent Force of Our Defense System"]

[Text] Why does the so-called "neutron" bomb trigger so many emotions? Our nuclear arsenal seems complete; to be sure, its different components must be constantly improved, but is it really useful to introduce a new weapon into this very costly panoply?

Now, then, the neutron bomb is only a tactical nuclear weapon, no more and no less. Only the effects of the explosion are different; the act of presenting the final warning remains the same whatever the characteristics of the weapons.

Beyond this final warning, to be sure, there would be the use of strategic thermonuclear weapons, those of direct retaliation on the attacker's territory. Before reaching that point, however, we should be in a position to deter any attempt to penetrate our frontiers by a possible enemy's land, naval or air forces--an enemy whose end objective is, in fact, total territorial conquest making it possible to impose unconditional surrender on its opponent.

In what ways at present could our territory be invaded by forces coming from the outside? First, there could be--we are well acquainted with this--the style of invasion that German armed columns and Stukas imposed on us in 1940. If the Warsaw Pact's 50,000 tanks swept through the buffer slopes of Western Europe, what would happen? Taking into account the progress made in the use of antitank weapons--taking into account the tactical nuclear weapon firepower of NATO's allied forces--taking into account the possible use of tactical neutron weapons of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe--an invasion by land coming from the east would undoubtedly be stopped.

The second invasion threat could come from the sea. That is very unlikely. For this very specific case, even without our having the tactical neutron bomb, the standard nuclear bomb would effectively protect us. It would no longer be possible for an armada of the type that landed in Normandy in 1944 to gain a foothold on our soil.

There remains, however, a third threat that has never been thoroughly studied, and which, in our eyes, seems the most disquieting--that is, the threat of invasion by air. Self-contained airlift operations targeted at the vital centers in the heart of an enemy defense system can always be successfully carried out in the face of an unprepared adversary. And apparently at present we are badly or not at all prepared.

In an article that came out 25 years ago, in April 1956--before the Suez expedition, which might not have been a defeat if we had had means of air transport adapted to that operation (the TRANSALL had not yet been built)--I looked at the requirements of vertical assault operations in a nuclear war.²

I still think that a large-scale Entebbe-type operation is part of the Soviet high command's strategic hypotheses. According to well-informed sources, Moscow could currently have seven airlifted divisions available of 7,300 men each along with 550 Antonov-12's and 50 Antonov-22's specialized in tank and missile launcher transport. Therefore, the Soviets would be in a position to launch a series of self-contained airlift operations on our soil which, with good intelligence and good leadership, could strike at the very heart of our country by seizing a few vital centers.³ In all countries--such is the case in the Soviet Union, too--airlifted formations are made up of elite troops. The strangulation could be rapid.

How is such a threat to be faced and how, above all, are the authors of such an undertaking to be deterred? The tactical neutron bomb is deadly at the

moment of its explosion to any exposed living thing. On the other hand, it only takes 1.5 meters of earth to be protected from the lethal radiation. Of course, a large-scale airlift operation targeted, for example, on one or several airfields in the Paris region would be detected well before its first waves had reached our borders. As soon as they crossed those borders our alerted tactical air forces could oppose that penetration if they were prepared for it. But they would without doubt be running up against powerful escort forces from the enemy's side; for a determined attacker, success would be possible for such an operation in spite of the risks.

So, when the first waves hit our soil there would be no question of using standard tactical nuclear artillery such as along the border or along the coastline. In actuality, defending forces and the civilian population would have to be deeply buried at the moment of the explosion, which is impossible.

With the tactical neutron bomb, the solution can be found. The construction of a shelter sited at a slight depth is within everyone's capacity. People would assemble at a garden, cellar or apartment building basement shelter as soon as the alert is given. At the moment when the first enemy waves hit our soil, and perhaps even before, the neutron bomb released from the nearest self-propelled missile launcher would come into play in the path of the aerial convoy. It would be this way for all landing areas. Just as for an invasion of grasshoppers, a neutralizing aerial dusting would put these new grasshoppers out of the fight.

It is not up to me to examine here the forms of the organization of such a defense. It is certain that the territorial defense ground forces would in this regard have an important role to play. In any case, if it is genuinely established that there is a gap in our defensive system, it must be filled without delay. The effort that should be made for that does not require much in the way of resources. It is within our capacity. But let us not forget that the main element of this defense would be the build-up of a sufficient stock of tactical neutron bombs. Those same bombs could also be used along our borders or along the coastline in the event NATO's allied forces had not succeeded in stopping the adversary's ground or sea forces.

In certain estates that are difficult to guard, particularly at night, there once were and still exist deterrent signs carrying the following inscription: "Danger--Man-traps." The defensive system based on tactical neutron bombs is the "man-trap" system that we need, very quickly, to put in place in order to protect our security and our freedom.

Should this be recommended to all European members of the Atlantic alliance? The question must be asked.

FOOTNOTES

1. It seems that this is one of the important concerns of the Mauroy Government and of its defense minister.

2. Quotes taken from the article "Assault and Vertical Assault Air Transport in Nuclear War," by Colonel Berge of the airborne forces, in REVUE DES FORCES AERIENNES FRANCAISES, Issue No 114, April 1956:

"The more a self-contained vertical assault operation is directed at the very heart of enemy territory, the more chances of success it will have. For that is how the destructive effect will be greatest and that is how nuclear response will be weakest.* In short, such an operation is only conceivable if it is carried out by mobile and powerful forces that in a general conflict would constitute formidable offensive assets."

*The neutron bomb was not yet invented.

And further: "The vertical assault arm will in a generalized conflict be one of the trump cards of tomorrow's strategists."

3. The Taverny operational center, for example, or the Mont Verdun one in the Lyon region.

9631

CSO: 3100/485

'RIGHTWING PISTOLEER' WANTED FOR WELCH'S DEATH

NC071811 Athens ELEVETHEROTIPIA in Greek 7 May 82 pp 1, 15

[Excerpts] The well-known extreme rightwing "pistoleer" Khrysostomos Psomiadis, or Makis, is wanted by the police for interrogation in connection with the assassination of CIA stationmaster Welch in Athens, of Evang, Mallios, and of Petros Bambalis.

This was learned yesterday from an authoritative police source. According to this source, at the suggestion of police officers Psomiadis was supposed to have been interrogated at the time of the assassinations about his connection with these cases. But, strangely enough, at that time he was not among the wanted suspects.

Psomiadis has again become the focus of police interest following his involvement in the kidnapping of ship owner N. Sekhopoulos and, mainly, following the reexamination of the dossiers by the new leadership at the Ministry of Public Order on the three assassinations.

Psomiadis' extreme rightwing political activities are well known to the Athens and Kavala police authorities. Recently, the police wanted him as a suspect for the recent bomb attacks in Kavala. The Kavala gendarmerie have discovered Psomiadis' private liaison with a retired Junta lieutenant.

CSO: 4621/330

PREMIER OUTLINES ROLE OF REGIONS IN ENERGY POLICY

Paris REVUE GENERALE NUCLEAIRE in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 58-61

[Article: "Energy Policy Information and Decentralization"]

[Excerpts] Details on the New Institutions and Procedures

The new structures and procedures called for in the energy independence plan (adopted last October by the National Assembly) are now being defined and implemented. During December several government communiques and circulars provided details on their establishment, function and goals. Thus, the trends and procedures of a policy intended "to reconcile democracy and energy" and whose guidelines were only outlined in the October parliamentary debate have become clearer. We give below substantial excerpts from the documents concerning the information committees for the large energy suppliers, the regional energy agencies, the regional energy plans and the high-level scientific commission on the handling of irradiated fuels.

Information Committees for Large Energy Suppliers

Letter from the Premier to the Prefects

"...The government has decided to facilitate the implementation of an information committee for each large power plant if desired by the elected officials the communities concerned. The goal of this circular is to define general operating conditions which can be adapted to take into account suggestions made locally.

Plants Concerned

"The plants concerned are standard thermal and nuclear power stations with an output over 1,000 megawatts, plants which process irradiated fuel, large hydro-electric stations, and underground natural gas storage facilities. In certain cases other suppliers could establish such a committee.

Creation of the Committee

"The establishment of the committee will not be imposed by law: The initiative is to come from the departmental council of the locality in question, in conjunction with the departmental councils of neighboring departments when they are also involved.

"Committees can be created for power stations which are now under construction or in use.

"The establishment of such a committee is particularly desirable when in depth studies are being made on where to locate a large power station.

Appointment and Composition of the Committee

"The president and members of the committee will be appointed by the president of the departmental council of the area where the station is located, in conjunction with the prefect.

"When a station is built near the boundary of a department the composition of the committee must be adapted to also include elected officials and individuals from neighboring departments.

"Elected officials (mayors, departmental council members, members of parliament) will hold a minimum of half the seats on the council, and it would be desirable for the mayors and departmental council members most concerned with the power plant to hold seats. In addition, it would be advisable to offer all of the bodies who have a vital interest in the station--representatives of the local chapters of the major unions, of industrial and agricultural organizations and of environmental protection associations--a chance to participate.

"In some cases it would also be useful to appoint the committee individuals, especially from universities, whom the elected officials could designate on the basis of their expertise, as well as a representative from the regional energy agency.

Mission

"The task of the committees is both to inform and to follow up on the impact of large power plants.

"The committees can organize the information for the community in whatever way they deem most appropriate.

"The president of the committee can send any advice or recommendations to the minister of energy. It would be desirable for an annual activities report to be sent to the minister.

Operating Conditions

"The committee may have access to all of the information and studies of the developers, as well as the regulations imposed on them by the agencies which

"control them, with the exception of those pertaining to industrial and trade secrets, public safety requirements and national defense secrets. The government will make sure that such exceptions are applied only when absolutely necessary. It has been, in particular, decided to draw up unclassified versions of the safety reports of nuclear installations.

"The information committees will be regularly kept up to date on the status of the studies, construction and operation of the large plants.

"The prefect will be in charge of coordinating the evaluation and participation of the governmental agencies and of the project's developers. The interdepartmental director of industry may, at the president's request, provide the assistance of his agency and handle the technical administration of the committee.

Financing the Committee

"During the operational period the functioning of the committee will be financed by the local jurisdictions which will benefit economically from the power plant. The method for doing this will be defined at the local level.

"During the construction period a lump sum public contribution will be given to the departmental council which will define conditions for its use and, if need be, will furnish financial assistance in conjunction with other local jurisdictions.

"While waiting for specific budget credits to be assigned, the public establishments in question will provide this annual lump-sum contribution to the departmental council which will use it for the committee's functioning. This contribution has been set under current economic conditions at 100,000 francs for large thermal power stations and 50,000 francs for other power plants.

Coordination: National Conference of Presidents

"In order to allow for exchange of information and experience among the different committees, as well as for dialogue between these committees and the government, a national conference of presidents will be instituted. This conference, which should meet at least once a year at the initiative of the minister of energy, will be able to publish any type of advice or recommendations, particularly in order to improve public information regarding large power plants. The government will consult with it on the general trends of projects for changing the procedures regarding large power plants...."

"...I am especially interested in seeing information committees rapidly established at each nuclear power plant site...."

Regional Energy Plans and Discussions, Regional Energy Agencies

Letter From the Premier to the Presidents of the Regional Councils

"...So that the goals which the administration has established may be attained, and while waiting for the final legislation on the decentralized jurisdiction of powers, it seems to me that it is important for the regions to have the immediate possibility of obtaining the means for fulfilling the tasks which will be given to them in the area of energy. These means include the development of regional energy plans and the possible creation of regional energy agencies.

"It is up to the regional councils to implement all provisions needed:

--To initiate regional energy discussions and to draw up a regional energy plan including a needs study, inventory of available resources and technical preparation of choices relative to the overall orientation of regional policy;

--To define, coordinate and, if need be, implement a policy of energy information and of training in energy savings and renewable energy.

"They could also play an advisory role to the local communities and encourage and support actions taken or that will be taken by these communities.

"It is up to the regional assembly over which you preside to take this new activity into account on a technical level in whatever way you deem most appropriate: as a separate regional agency or as part of a larger regional agency or institution.

"It is up to you, therefore, to define the practical methods that the region intends to use in order to finance the tasks that will be entrusted to it in the areas of energy savings and new energy sources. Regional energy discussions which will take place under your auspices could be an occasion for defining the methods which the region wants to adopt and to which the government would be disposed to contribute.

"Finally, so that the region can play its role as a coordinator, I will make sure that the regional councils are kept up to date on national energy policies as well as on the methods of implementation...."

Circular from the Minister of State, the Minister of Planning and Territorial Development and from the Assistant Minister of Energy to the Regional Prefects

"The regional plan will include the following major provisions:

a) An inventory of the region's energy resources.

b) An examination of existing conditions which will result in:

--A better control of energy consumption in the region, by taking into account the prospects for economic and demographic development of the region:

--The development of local energy sources;

--Improvement of energy provisioning and a contribution by the region to the national program of energy independence.

c) A definition of the region's role in the energy field.

While waiting for a precise legal definition on the division of jurisdictional powers among the state, the region and the local communities, a distinction can be made between the activities that seem to be most suitable for the region itself to undertake and those which would be a contribution by the region to the national programs:

c1) Activities to be undertaken by the regions themselves?

--Regional policy on information and training, especially including advice to users in conjunction with the state and with local communities;

--Advice to local communities;

--Support to regional technical institutions (universities, schools, technical centers) which can intervene in the region to benefit energy users in the areas of research and development, technical assistance, tests (ratings) and training;

--Definition and implementation of a regional program of prospecting, producing and developing local energy sources, especially geothermal energy, solar energy and wind energy, energy from the biomass, energy derived from the collection and use of wastes, heat networks and the use of hydraulic energy in plants with an output of less than 4,500 kilowatts.

C2) Regional proposals designed to contribute to activities of the state or of its public institutions in the areas of their jurisdiction, especially:

--An inventory of regional positions on energy savings and energy substitution and their development within the framework of regional, departmental or local programs which contribute to national programs for controlling and orienting consumption, in particular as this concerns local communities;

--Support for national resource inventory programs;

--Contribution to activities related to the distribution of electrical energy and the transportation of natural gas.

d) The methods.

These will be decided upon and implemented by the region.

This could first of all mean establishing a regional energy agency if the region does not already have one. The jurisdiction of this agency could be that suggested in the prime minister's letter to the presidents of the regional councils.

The programs that are implemented could call upon regional, departmental or local resources; the state could use the regional methods within the framework of the state-region planning contracts.

9720

CSO: 3100/530

NEW ENERGY POLICY SHOWN IN 2-YEAR INTERIM PLAN

Paris COMBUSTIBLES ET CARBURANTS in French Mar 82 pp 8-9

[Article: "The Interim Plan for the Energy Sector"]

[Text] A few weeks ago the government published its proposals in the area of energy as an interim 2-year plan.

In this journal we are producing the passages which concern our activities and which are liable to affect the opinions of business leaders and to modify their actions.

First of all, the intention to create an energy agency within the regional assemblies in each region was confirmed. This agency will be responsible for developing an energy plan and it would be desirable for our profession to be represented within this agency in order to inform it of existing needs.

Next, the desire to continue energy diversification while at the same time continuing to develop national resources should be mentioned. But on the other hand, the necessity of slowing energy consumption and of using energy more efficiently and wisely was stressed.

If means are provided to pursue it, this trend, will enable some firms to engage in more diversified activities. This will, of course, require adaptation and new technical training.

We have this need in mind when we offer to develop professional training programs for our members.

The following clause especially bothers us--the question of "again" reducing the share of oil and of directing consumption toward other resources by increasing the share of coal and developing an efficient use of electricity. Since it is not possible to change the share reserved for motor fuel, it is obvious that heating oil will bear the brunt of this reduction.

But on the whole is this really reasonable, since it has now been shown that oil resources are becoming more and more diversified throughout the world, new discoveries confirm that oil exists, that it is abundant and that its price is liable to become more and more competitive if taxes are not abusively added to it?

It would be reasonable if it could be replaced right away by new, more certain resource, more reliable and cheaper. But is this really the case if, for certain users, this oil has to be replaced by natural gas which must travel thousands of kilometers in a pipeline across innumerable countries and, moreover, when this gas must be bought at particularly high prices?

All of this does not seem very reasonable.

There is, of course, a necessity and an obligation toward all types of energy-- to use them intelligently and efficiently and always to eliminate waste so that the consumers' conditions of comfort and security are improved while heating costs are lowered.

These conditions entail a certain number of evident choices in which discrete, stockable forms of energy will continue to be more and more appreciated by users.

This statement opens up a lot of possibilities, which are also mentioned in the government report in the areas of the standards to be applied to new construction and also to the improvement of existing housing.

Many firms will probably be able to find some not insignificant new areas of activity because of this.

The hints of energy substitution by others should cause us to rethink a certain number of established positions which will have to change profoundly in the next decade.

Nothing should be neglected in this area, but here again these are not trends to be taken lightly.

All professional organizations are asked to examine themselves on the basis of these propositions, because their members hold them responsible for both defending their activities and insuring their existence and continuity.

A New Energy Policy

In accord with the commitments of the president of the Republic and the government, the new energy policy was presented to parliament on 6 and 7 October, 1981. The discussion, which concluded with a vote in which the government committed itself to the program, was preceded by a number of consultations with professional and union organizations, public and private associations and the economic and social council. The production and trade committee of the National Assembly established a special information task force at this time. Regional discussions were opened and will help disseminate information to the public and widen its participation in the decision process.

Procedures and Institutions

It was proposed that each region develop an energy plan which, based on an inventory of regional consumption and resources, will include programs defined or

implemented at the local, departmental or regional level, as the case may be. A regional energy agency can be created within each regional assembly.

The administration will examine a reform of the public inquiry which will emphasize public hearings, currently used in a number of developed countries. Before choosing energy sites it will undertake a regional consultation on possible locations.

On the local level, an information committee will be created for each energy site. A national conference of the chairmen of the local information committees will be held.

According to the recommendations made since 1980 by the National Statistical Council and the Economic and Social Council, a coherent structure for collecting and studying statistical information on energy will be established, primarily in order to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of energy consumption. This structure will depend heavily on the resources of INSEE [National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies] and the Ministries of Industry and Energy. Within this same framework, an energy observation post, with statistical and documentary functions, will be created within the Ministry of Energy. The general planning commission and the ministries responsible for policies affecting the major consumer sectors will be involved in defining and implementing statistical, study and research programs on energy. The purpose of these programs will be primarily to improve information at the regional and local level.

At the administration's suggestion, parliament decided to create a permanent energy delegation which will strengthen the impact of the parliamentary group designed to evaluate scientific and technological choices.

Finally, in order to insure better control over nuclear safety:

--The role of the high commissioner for atomic energy will be strengthened and the independence of the Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety guaranteed;

--A high level official will be appointed to work with the general director of EDF [French Electric Company] to supervise the continuation and strengthening of actions taken to insure safety in the construction and functioning of installations;

--The independence of the High Council on Nuclear Safety will be strengthened and its makeup changed; a special high-level scientific commission will be created for the council, to deal with the reprocessing of irradiated fuel.

Speed Up the Reduction of Dependence

One of the first responses to our situation of dependence lies in diversifying our supplies. This means continuing to develop national resources, strengthening programs for renewable energy sources, resorting to oil from the ocean depths, developing publicly assisted recovery operations and the upgrading of

crude and, finally, diversifying our imports by type and geographical origin while encouraging the emergence of large-scale mining operations in the public sector, apt, because of their size and competency, to stabilize the market trends.

The second part of reducing our vulnerability involves controlling consumption. The increase in energy consumption must be slowed by using it more efficiently and more wisely. In addition, in order to reduce the share of oil, this consumption must be directed toward other sources; the use of coal must especially be increased and good usage of electricity developed.

In order to make up for lost time in this area, control of consumption will be the first priority of France's energy policy which, at the same time, will strive to control the changes in the supply and the price of energy offered to consumers.

Controlling Consumption

The wise use of energy requires a twofold policy: energy savings and substituting alternative forms of energy for oil.

This policy can lead to the creation of a number of jobs, as confirmed by macro macroeconomic simulations done with METRIC and DMS models. An estimation of the effects of a basic program of energy savings based on increasing investments from 1981 to 1986, with an average of 24 billion francs (1981 value) a year over these 6 years, shows that such a program means an economic recovery resulting in about 160,000 new jobs, and this would entail a decrease in unemployment by 73,000. In addition, the deterioration in the foreign trade balance caused by the recovery would be temporary and clearly less than would be brought on by a classical recovery program on the same scale. A study of variables having to do with increased efforts to save energy shows that for each billion additional francs of annual investment, in 1986 employment will increase from 5,200 to 13,000, depending upon the sector in which the energy savings investments are made, and unemployment will decrease from 2,500 to 7,000. Variables having to do with the substitution of coal for fuel oil in industry have similar effects.

All firms will be affected by the activities and production of materiel or equipment related to this investment policy, but particularly the small and medium-sized firms, a development which will strengthen economic and regional development and encourage a balanced division of activities throughout the country.

Moreover, such a policy will be a determining element of competitiveness and profitability in our economy and a way of improving our trade balance in the long run.

Consumption Goals

The policy presented by the administration and approved by parliament was defined on the basis of an analysis of consumption based on:

--The necessity that energy provisioning in no case put a brake on economic and social growth and development;

--The desire to have a more ambitious policy for controlling energy consumption which means an overall growth lower than that forecast by the preceding administration but with economic growth at an equal level, at least: 232 million Toe in 1990 instead of the 242 set in March 1980.

Methods Implemented For An Efficient Use of Energy

The new energy policy is based on a significant strengthening of the goals of efficient energy use and of the means to achieve this. These means are largely dependent on the characteristics inherent in each sector of consumption: in particular residential and service, and industry and transportation.

Residential and Service Sector

The policy of efficient energy use in this sector must respond to three imperatives:

a) Fulfilling a social function

This means limiting or even lowering heating costs, a necessary expenditure which has now reached a critical level for low income households. The administration will make sure that the measures it takes to encourage energy savings will be socially just and will integrate the goal of efficient energy usage into its general housing policy in order in particular to make a significant and lasting improvement in the heating efficiency of the country's housing, both already built and to be built. Thus, individuals with modest incomes will be especially encouraged to save energy.

b) Decentralizing the planning and implementation of activities

Because they are highly dispersed, the residential and service sectors involve a large number of decisionmakers who must be mobilized efficiently or else the goals determined will never be implemented. Decentralization is one condition for this mobilization. Study and work programs at regional, departmental or local levels must be implemented on the initiative of the communities in question.

c) Contributing to the recovery of activity in the public works sector

The state will match this recovery with an informational and industrial policy which will primarily encourage professionals to regroup in order to carry out significant and long-term energy-saving activities and to contract with their clients (individuals, co-owners, local communities, state bureaus) as to the outcome of the work in terms of actual energy savings. The purpose of this is to permit the different professions concerned to bring quality benefits to operators who want to carry out energy saving undertakings.

From this point of view, the measures affecting the residential and service sectors are:

--In new construction, control of consumption means a strengthening of the standards for heat efficiency of buildings. The first stage will be reached in 1982 (a gain of 25-30 percent) and a new mark in anticipation of the legislated goal for 1985 (a gain of 50 percent) will be set in order to encourage construction foremen to forge ahead. A similar attempt will be undertaken in the service sector. A strengthening of the heating regulations for the new service sector will come under study in 1982;

--As regards already existing housing, financing available to construction foremen has already been subject to several improvements. Subsidies for heating improvements in moderate income and official housing have, in particular, been more than doubled for 1982;

--An energy savings account has been created on the same principle as the housing savings account but there is more of an incentive, which will enable loans based on this account to be distributed as of 1 January 1982; a deduction from taxable income, specifically for home energy saving investments, has been established in the 1982 finance law and the possibility of a tax reduction measure will be studied for 1983. If necessary, the administration will study the possibility of creating a special aid to owner-occupants by drawing from subsidized credits for new construction;

--The government will redirect ANAH [National Association for the Improvement of the Habitat] subsidies toward energy savings. At the same time specific heating regulations will be established for state subsidized work in old buildings. The administration will undertake the study of legislative measures concerning consumption standards for equipment and will propose an obligatory "heating reduction" for group housing, which will apply in the coming 10 years. This last point is addressed in a draft bill submitted to parliament for the spring 1982 session;

--Finally, the government will apply a program and plan for energy savings and the use of new sources of energy to all state-owned buildings and vehicles and national firms. Similarly, it will encourage the establishment of such programs by local communities.

The Industrial Sector

--The administration will examine methods of tax encouragement (an accelerated or gradual depreciation system) for credit-lease institutions and large-scale investment projects such as coal conversion or heating networks.

--The SOFERGIE management system will be reexamined before 31 March 1982 on the basis of the financial results obtained by these firms.

--Every company presenting an efficient energy use plan should obtain appropriate financing, as long as its financial situation is not compromised. For this

purpose, guaranteed loans will be adapted to the amounts needed and medium-term bank credits will be made available to match needs.

--The National Credit Bureau and the Equipment Credit Bureau for Small and Medium-Sized Firms will implement an "energy service." Each regional delegation of these firms and each SDR [Regional Development Society] will designate an energy officer from among its members.

Coal

Because of its worries about independence and diversification, France must not abandon its place on the world coal scene. This is why the administration is initiating an ambitious coal policy based both on national and imported coal. This policy aims at maintaining French coal consumption at a level of 35 to 40 million Tonne (53-60 million tons of coal).

The level of national production will correspond to the selective development of exploitable reserves, the additional cost of which, financed by the state, will not exceed the cost of imported coal by more than 2.5 centimes per thermal unit. The conditions for implementing this policy will be defined in the plan contract concluded between the state and the French Coal Board. This contract will spell out the means for insuring the recovery of national coal production, primarily by a pluriannual investment program, a vigorous prospecting effort and implementation of an ambitious training plan.

For imports, the administration will define the organization of methods to be implemented to insure France's position on the world coal market and to undertake the marketing of coal in France through dynamic, diversified transactions. It is especially important for experienced operators, who are competent to participate in international projects, to be able as soon as possible to control abroad a volume of resources adapted to our needs. The French Coal Board, national oil companies and COGEMA [Nuclear Materials General Company] are examples of such mine operators who could intervene as a complement to the ATIC [Technical Association for the Importation of Coal].

As for the utilization of coal, the actions foreseen for controlling consumption will be perfected through experimentation and perfecting of coal distillation methods, with a particular emphasis on the development of oxyvapo-distillation procedures which produce industrial gas of a medium thermal strength. In addition, environmental standards should be respected. To add to this and in order to develop possibilities for coal consumption, while still trying to obtain a better balance in electric power stations, the construction of two coal-fired heating plants of 600 MWe [megawatts electrical] should begin in 1984. Site determination will be undertaken in the 2-year plan.

Oil

The administration will encourage the oil industry to:

--Continue the inventory and exploration of French ground and maritime hydrocarbon resources, in France and abroad;

--Improve the diversification of our sources of foreign oil supplies;

--Undertake a technological research effort which will result in new resources: hydrocarbons from the ocean depths, publicly assisted recovery operations and improvement of crude oil;

--Diversify in other energy areas.

Since the country's energy independence implies the existence of a competitive refining industry, the government, in conjunction with our profession, will implement a coordinated plan for the next few years, legislating principally:

--The system of prices on the domestic market;

--The well-regulated reduction of distillation capacity;

--An investment program, primarily involving conversion capacities which will allow the refining process to be adapted.

Fiscal Financing and Prices

The measures already taken and those planned by the government at the beginning of the 2-year plan are a first step on the road of the policy that has just been explained. It is clear, however, that in the area of financial and fiscal measures, currently limited by the 1982 budget restraints, financial means are liable not to correspond to the ambitions of the goals outlined above.

During the 1982-1983 interim plan it would therefore be advisable to study and implement means of strengthening subsidies for energy investments, with first priority to those involving the efficient use of energy and the development of new forms of energy. In particular, the following are foreseen:

--The possibility of a selective decontrol of credits granted to firms for energy saving investments, for substituting carbon for fuel oil and efficient use of electricity;

--Recourse to international loans which will also help improve the recycling of capital coming from the sale of oil by exporting countries, and, if our partners agree, the establishment of a European loan designed to finance investments for the rational use of energy.

The policy on domestic energy prices will be determined according to the following goals:

--Unambiguously encourage energy saving behavior;

--Encourage, through the play of relative prices, the substitution of other forms of energy for oil;

--Insure adequate self-financing of energy producing firms;

--Restore the financial situation of the French refining industry.

Uncertainty regarding consumption and supplies in 1990 is already sizable. The measures called for during the preparation of the 2-year plan reflect the preliminary trends in the new energy policy. This is why the government will take advantage of the preparation of the 1984-1988 5-year plan to embark on a flexible energy program, including in it long-term projects, up to the horizons of 1995 and 2000.

	1973		1981		1990	
	MToe	%	MToe	%	MToe	%
Industry, steel & iron	61.6	34.6	60.6	32.0	81.0	34.9
Residential and service	58.6	32.9	63.7	33.7	77.0	33.2
Agriculture	2.9	1.6	2.8	1.5	3.2	1.4
Transportation	31.9	17.9	35.7	18.9	43.7	18.8
Final consumption	155.0	87.0	162.8	86.1	204.9	88.3
Energy sector and losses	23.2	13.0	26.2	13.9	27.1	11.7
Total consumption	178.2	100.0	189.0	100.0	232.0	100.0

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CSO: 3100/455

PLI'S ZANONE CONFIRMS OPPOSITION TO USSR GAS DEAL

Milan IL GIORNO in Italian 7 Apr 82 p 2

[Text] Zanone: We prefer gas from Algeria. At a press conference Malagodi added, "To give 8 billion dollars to the USSR for the natural gas pipeline would mean favoring the financing of an aggressive policy." Disagreements with Minister Emilio Colombo: he does not keep Parliament informed on foreign policy. Early elections? "They would be a gamble."

Rome, 7 April (MF)--The Liberals prefer Algerian gas to the Soviet kind. They see the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands as an attempt by a military regime having difficulties [at home] to get rid of them abroad. They disapprove of the government's silence vis a vis Parliament on foreign policy; and they reiterate that June elections would be a gamble, especially because of the period of tension in world relations. "It would mean being 6 months without a government and in the current economic situation that would be dangerous," said the PLI president Giovanni Malagodi.

Malagodi appeared with secretary Valerio Zanone yesterday morning to elucidate the Liberal Party document on foreign policy. But, with that connection between internal and external developments which was emphasized several times, the official reason for holding the press conference became an occasion to discuss Italy. The Liberals began by reiterating the defense of human rights. "We are no longer so far from Craxi's socialists; and we bitterly condemn the DC's 'non-policy.'" Human rights are at the "heart of the policies of independent democracies," it was said. However, in many parts of the world they are trampled on, while the West ignores the violations (Zanone cited the case of exterminations in Eritrea) or they are divided on the diagnoses (as in El Salvador). We are under a "half-war regime," Malagodi said, "it should be replaced by a non-war one." The means for this should be the reduction of all armaments and a new impulse to European policies. After this beginning, Malagodi attacked Minister Emilio Colombo, accused of keeping developments at the international level "away from the constitutional organs." There was no information provided on the meetings held in the United States, nor on the "Ten" summit at Brussels. "This is a very serious matter," the PLI president stated. And it is likely to create new tensions in the majority [coalition] in May, when a decision must be reached on the Siberian natural gas pipeline.

The Liberals would prefer a contract with Algeria because the source is closer and the interlocutor less "difficult." To give \$8 billion to the USSR "would mean favoring an aggressive policy, and depending on the USSR for 35 percent of our supply of gas," Malagodi declared. "To finance the USSR is unjust; to increase our energy dependence on Moscow is incautious," Zanone added. And what of the possibility of June elections, which Zanone boasted of having foreseen months ahead? The Liberal secretary repeated his "no," as we report elsewhere. "Domestic problems cannot be dealt with without considering the foreign aspect."

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CSO: 3104/177

BRIEFS

UNPAID EXPORTS TO LIBYA--The Council of Ministers yesterday approved the granting of a pre-payment of up to 50 percent to those industrialists who exported their products to Libya without having received payment from this country for over 5 months. The grant is being given in accordance with the exports insurance plan. [Excerpt] [Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 30 Apr 82 p 1]

CSO: 4621/333

STUDY DESCRIBES HOW FRENCH FIRMS LOSE FOREIGN CONTRACTS

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 25 Mar 82 pp 133-135

[Article by Eric Lecourt: "Exports: Lessons From Failures"]

[Text] French firms that export durable goods maintained their course in 1981. An analysis by DREE [Office for Foreign Economic Relations] provides a wealth of lessons: high prices, inadequate local establishment and insufficient commercial networks are the primary reasons for failure. They point up the fragility of our foreign trade structures.

As experienced as they are in international trade techniques, durable goods exporters sometimes still make careless mistakes that are costly to them. By submitting bids past the deadlines and by not following procedures, the French stupidly lost building construction contracts in Algeria and road contracts in Botswana last year. "Even if they are marginal, these oversights are no less unforgivable for experienced exporters," commented experts at the Office for Foreign Economic Relations [DREE] who have just examined the contracts lost last year by French firms with a fine-tooth comb.

Each quarter the Quai Branly receives the reports sent by the economic expansion bureaus scattered in the four corners of the world. The commercial advisors scrutinize both signed and lost contracts and send their analyses. "A regular examination of our failures, and especially of their causes, will enable us to refine our strategy so as to improve our share of the market," stated DREE, which until now has been more used to preparing successful balance sheets.

Almost 300 lost contracts were closely examined. The major reason for failure found by the civil servants at the Quai Branly: prices. More than 50 percent of contracts are lost by French firms because of a proposed price that was too high. "We can't fight over the prices, because we are always the losers," confirmed Jean-Paul Foity, Asian delegate for RVI [not further identified]. "When confronted with his Japanese competitors, he plays the only card possible, quality, while trying as best he can to do something with the prices."

The deterioration of our competitiveness has made this activity more and more dangerous. How can you reduce discrepancies that often reach 30 percent and sometimes surpass 50 percent? "Reduce our social and tax obligations," Yvon Gattaz, president of the CNPF [National Council of French Employers], has

challenged the administration. The increase in salaries, the growth in taxes and the increased weight of social obligations have worked against French firms. But, curiously, DREE experts have observed that the price discrepancies do not necessarily mean a lack of competitiveness. Some reveal a reduced interest in the contract because of the firm's involvement in other locations or a fear that the work will not go smoothly. Other, less significant price differences result from an insufficient flexibility of our firms.

The Best Drawing Card Is Still the Reference

Although prices are by far the major reason for our failures, sometimes that is just an excuse. "Too often, French exporters are satisfied that their failures are due to their lack of competitiveness. Behind this ostensible reason hide other reasons," says DREE.

The first fact is that our lack of an establishment or insufficient presence in a particular area has worked against us several times, regardless of the country or the area of activity: in Greece for the construction of a university hospital center, in Zimbabwe for a tunnel, in South Africa for a fertilizer factory, etc. "Large contracts require good experience and long-term local establishment," explained Miguel Doze, one of the directors of Saint-Gobain's international activities. "You must be large enough to penetrate these markets." In Algeria, a small to medium sized French firm lost a housing construction contract because the local authorities thought it was too small. Modest size and inadequate local establishment are handicaps to signing large contracts. In the Middle East, Saint-Gobain has offices in Cairo, Baghdad and the Emirates so that it can begin projects from the earliest possible point in the manufacturing process and strengthen its credibility with its clients.

But the best drawing card is still the reference. Whether it is obtained in France or elsewhere, or better yet in the country itself during an earlier contract, it proves the success and possibilities of the contractor. Without it, clients hesitate. In no case do they want to be used as guinea pigs. DREE has noted, however, that we offer up-to-the-minute equipment that has so far been little used; the supplying of telephone equipment in South Africa was lost because the purchaser thought that the equipment had been insufficiently tested.

The French, who are not well established locally compared with their competition, make other equally important mistakes through their inadequate knowledge of local conditions. Who decides? Who has the power to change things? "Through a lack of information, the French wind up betting on the wrong horse," commented Miguel Doze. The "additional amount," an indispensable addition to many contracts for goods, does not always take the path of the best sponsor. In India and Indonesia, the French have been outwitted by competitors who had better contacts. "The verification of our currency exchange transactions, which we must undergo, doesn't make our task any easier," counter the exporters.

Although the technical quality of our projects is rarely questioned, our commercial behavior is looked upon poorly: missed deadlines, inadequate quality control and poor after-sales service. The size of prior contracts spills over onto transactions currently being negotiated. Our commercial mistakes have not

gone unnoticed. "Many French firms, new to exporting, have not adequately integrated the idea of service," regretfully explained a director of a public works firm. When questioned about these weaknesses, firms are slow to recognize them themselves. Besides prices, they prefer to explain their failures by emphasizing the financing conditions of these large-scale projects. They throw the ball to the banks and DREE. However, the civil servants at the Quai Branly explain, with files to back them up, that the financing conditions offered to clients cause very few failures. "The firms can blame us, perhaps, for not taking the first steps, but when we have to agree to the same conditions as our competitors to win the deal, we do it," explained Jean-Claude Prevel of DREE's Bureau of Financial Affairs.

Do Not Reveal All the Cards

Some exporters insist that the administration reacts too slowly to those details that make a difference. "Sometimes it is harder to sell your project to DREE than to your client," exclaimed one export authority familiar with the workings of the Quai Branly. "The industrialist's role is to demand the most possible and to get it right away. The role of the administration, which handles the public finances, is not to reveal all its cards during the first round," added Jean-Rene Maillard, director of foreign trade at one of the major French banks.

The result is that the administration's arrangements sometimes stick in the throat of exporters when it refuses credit to a country where it is already heavily involved. But this does not undermine the French procedures, which are very competitive compared with those of our trading partners. To be convinced of this you only have to read the foreign press where all our competitors accuse us of getting our contracts because of our financing. In fact, the Eximbank, the institution that aids American exporters, describes our system as being "the most efficient and the most pernicious."

Without even mentioning the Canadians, who are now engaged in a real financial dumping, the situation is liable to turn sour. Japan, which has lower interest rates than those of the DECD majority, is already offering financing at conditions more advantageous than ours, and the Germans could follow in their footsteps. The only parry the French can make is to speed up the implementation of a hard currency financing system for their activities abroad.

Another worry for French firms is the additional credits. In addition to the standard financing of equipment, clients are more and more frequently asking their suppliers to finance the down payment and the local share. And some countries, such as Brazil, take advantage of this to ask for additional financial credits.

"Under the incentive of competition, additional credits have increased and they are becoming the center of the battlefield," explained Christophe Fay, deputy director of international affairs for the Credit Lyonnais. Faced by the growing number of buying countries, the banks must confront a two-fold problem. It is, first of all, a problem of funds, since they must obtain dollars in order to grant credits denominated in American money. And then, a problem of risk; for these financial credits, the banks have no collateral. This explains their

impatience to halt the demands on the countries heavily in debt (Eastern Europe, Brazil, etc.). "We are taking the risks. It is up to the banker to evaluate them and to say no to the industrialist when they are too great," replied Christophe Fay to the exporters, who accuse the bankers of taking it easy. Besides, nothing prevents them from playing on foreign competition, the banks emphasize.

But the French are so far doing little of this. This is the efficiency of our system, claim the bankers--the weight of our habits, retort the industrialists, an embarrassing status quo that is liable in the future to compromise the development of our sales of equipment abroad. Many of our clients are undergoing financial difficulties and are making the financing conditions offered by their suppliers one of the determining factors in their choice.

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CSO: 3100/550

BRIEFS

LARGE-SCALE CONTRACTS SIGNED IN 1981--Exporters will not begin to benefit from the large-scale contracts signed in 1981 until the next few months--in all, 92 billion in military contracts, a 30-percent increase over 1980. Five countries continue to play a major role in our sales: Saudia Arabia, the USSR, Nigeria, Brazil and Egypt. Last year, 40 percent of our contracts were signed with them. But our sales have also diversified and now include countries such as Indonesia, Norway and Venezuela. By sector, contracts for land development, sales of ships, platforms and planes as well as of personal durable goods have increased greatly. Orders for energy and industrial complexes have declined. Although a good year for these large contracts, 1981 did not mark the reversal of a disquieting tendency. For the first time, civilian and military commands did not pay for oil imports. [Text] [Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 25 Mar 82 p 134] 9720

CSO: 3100/550

PAPERS DISCUSS TRADE RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA

Obstacles Listed

NC071740 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 May 82 p 11

[Text] The issue of the further development of commercial and economic relations between the two countries was discussed in a conference between Greek and Romanian experts under Minister of Coordination Ap. Lazaris. It was decided to form a committee which will recommend immediate measures.

As Lazaris announced, the rapid development of relations between the two countries stumbles on the following factors:

1. The composition of the exchanges between the two countries, since 75 percent of the Romanians exports to us are industrial products, while 70 percent of their imports from us are agricultural products. However, it is obvious that Greece is now in a position to offer several industrial products. Consequently, the composition of our imports and exports should be diversified and, already, the committee which has been formed will undertake to propose specific products.
2. The fact that the already abolished clearing [agreement] between the two countries has left an unpaid balance of \$27 million in Greece's favor. During the talks at the Ministry of Coordination, the Romanian officials promised to pay this balance in free exchange by 31 January 1983.
3. The unpaid Romanian debts to Greek export enterprises which amount to \$10 million. A promise of settlement was given on this issue too.

Lazaris added that other bilateral issues were promoted during the Greek-Romanian discussions, such as:

--Increasing permits for the transit of Greek trucks to 2,000 annually (against 1,000 so far).

--The establishment of a bus line between Athens and Bucharest.

--The purchase of rolling stock (boxcars and locomotives) from Romania and the possible entrusting (naturally after international bids have been

received) to the Romanians of the electrification of the railway line between Athens and Thessaloniki.

--The establishment of joint Greek-Romanian businesses in the field of industry and so forth.

--Issues of Greek students in Romania.

--The issue of the transfer of pension rights of Greek political refugees.

Discordant Views on Cyprus

NC071720 Athens ELEVETHEROTIPIA in Greek 7 May 82 p 4

[Article by Kira Adham: "What Romania Wants From Us"]

[Excerpts] Greek-Turkish affairs, the Cyprus issue, Balkan cooperation with a special emphasis on the prospects for a nuclear-free zone in the region as well as questions of economic cooperation have composed the subject of the talks held by the Greek president and prime minister with Romanian President Ceausescu, the first leader of a Balkan country to pay an official visit to Greece after the political change of last October. All these are key issues for the future of bilateral relations as well as a practical "test" of the idea for multifaceted political cooperation in the Balkans which, in addition to good intentions, is confronted by many problems and obstacles.

The most basic issues raised by the Greek side were the questions of Greek-Turkish relations and, of course, the Cyprus issue. These are two issues which play a determining role in Greece's relations with any friendly country and, at the same time, are of particular importance for the future prospects of wider Balkan cooperation--a basic axis from the time of the change of regime and, mainly today, of both the Greek and Romanian foreign policy.

Following my contacts and talks with Romanian Foreign Ministry representatives in Bucharest a few days before the Romanian president's arrive in Athens, the views of the Romanian side appeared to be quite different from or at variance with the Greek positions. Faithful to the policy of "noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries" and to the policy of "equal distances," Romania believes that the differences between Greece and Turkey should be resolved strictly on a bilateral basis through direct talks between the parties concerned.

"The nature of the present dispute does not rule out its settlement through negotiations--if each of the two countries shows a spirit of good will--and we believe that steps will be taken in this direction," the Romanian president stated in a recent interview with the Turkish newspaper GUNES.

As a result of this stand by Romania, in addition to expressing its desire for a solution of Greek-Turkish problems (which, as admitted by Bucharest diplomatic circles, has a negative effect on the efforts for multifaceted

Balkan cooperation), it appears that Romanian does not want, at least until now, to attach particular weight to the dangers Greece is facing from the East while it refrains from making any reference to the Greek government's categorical decision not to negotiate on matters directly linked with Greece's national sovereignty.

Romania also adopted a similar stand on the Cyprus issue. In the opinion of this friendly country, both Greece and Turkey should move toward a solution that would safeguard the island's independence and the peaceful coexistence of the two communities in a manner that would also favor the normalization of relations between the two countries. In other words, the Romanian side does not seem to fully share Greece's efforts to internationalize the Cyprus issue, which also constitutes the positioning of the problem within its right framework.

Bucharest diplomatic circles do not deny their country's good relations with Turkey. Besides, they are linked with Turkey through close economic cooperation. According to 1980 data, Romania's exports to Turkey exceeded \$200 million, whereas Romanian imports did not exceed \$80 million.

The differences and variances in facing these issues, as they have been expressed until now, have not lessened the weight and significance which both Greece and Romania attach to the issue of cooperation in the Balkans-- "in this miniature of Europe," as the Romanian diplomats characteristically call the Balkans.

Within the framework of its more general strategy for the unity of Europe on the basis of the European people's interests and the common dangers being faced, primarily from the terrible nuclear armaments of the two superpowers on European territory, the Romanian side attaches particular significance to the promotion and realization of the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans; the Greek side also attaches exactly the same significance to this issue.

However, in addition to the close bilateral economic relations, Romania does not conceal the fact that it desires Greece's "mediation" in normalizing and promoting Romania's economic relations with the EEC countries and primarily with the Arab countries with which Romania does not maintain diplomatic relations.

In principle, Bucharest believes that Greece's positive opening to the Arab countries can, at some time, indirectly but positively affect Romania's efforts to restore some sort of relations with these countries while Romania's purchase of Libyan oil through Greece constitutes the first step.

The ultimate goal is the opening of cooperation with the moderate Arab countries not only in the field of oil but also in the field of Arab investments in Romania. In this direction, Romania believes that Greece can play a "catalytic" role.

CSO: 4621/329

FURTHER DECLINE IN INFLATION RATE FOR MARCH

Rome L'HUMANITA in Italian 3 Apr 82 p 2

[Text] Inflation continues to decline. Consumer prices increase by 0.9 percent in March.

According to Ravecca, employment levels must, however, be supported.

Inflation continues to decline. In the month of March the consumer price index for worker and employee families increased by 0.9 percent, compared to 1.3 percent reported for both January and February. The annual rate of price increases thus has settled at the expected level of 16 percent (16.1 percent, against the 20.6 percent of last June and the 18 percent of the end of the year). This is according to the provisional statistics released yesterday by ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute].

Under the individual headings the percentage increases were as follows: Food 0.7 (divided as follows: 0.2 percent for meat; 0.2 percent for milk, cheese and eggs). Clothing, 1.6 (0.7 percent for wearing apparel; 0.7 for cottons, linens, etc., for personal use; and 0.3 for footwear). Electricity and fuel, 0.9 (including 0.6 percent for electric energy). Housing, no change. Miscellaneous goods and services, 1.1 (including 0.4 percent for public commercial concerns, 0.3 percent for recreational and cultural articles and 0.2 percent for household articles).

The new decline marked by inflation in March confirms the forecasts for triggering cost-of-living adjustments next May for an upward adjustment of not more than 12 points, or perhaps even held within 11 points of the sliding scale.

ISTAT's consumer price index for worker and employee families (which, as has been mentioned, increased by only 0.9 percent in March) is different from the index used for the sliding scale ("trade union index") [used to determine cost-of-living adjustments]. However, the movement of the two indices is generally parallel. It is thus probable that the March decline [in the consumer price index for worker and employee families] will also be reflected in the trade union index.

Comrade Lino Ravecca, commenting on these data, released the following declaration: "Estimates about the slowing down of inflation raise serious concerns about the general context of the Italian economic and employment situation. The fact must not be underestimated that the squeeze to contain the inflationary processes has also caused a below-zero rate of development, a constant decline in investment, an alarming rate of unemployment, above all in the south and an extension of the wage integration fund.

"Naturally no one can recommend in good faith retreating in the emergency struggle, but this should not make one forget that each drastic reduction of inflation by one point is matched by an increase of about 200,000 unemployed.

"A government that intends to control not merely inflation alone cannot attain both balanced and socially satisfactory results if the hardest hit sectors turn out to be employment and investment.

"The fine tuning of the various economic policies should not make one forget the needed maneuvers in monetary policy and public investment, including a more rational use of resources.

"It is not a matter of changing policies but of slackening the 'hangman's noose' on the most vulnerable groups, asking trade unions and workers for a wage moderation that derives from a fair sharing of sacrifices; and proposing as compensation a few but urgent structural reforms which will not lose sight of balancing fiscal burdens and safeguarding the purchasing power of earnings."

The encouraging trend in inflation was confirmed by developments in wholesale prices whose increase during the first 3 months of the year almost halved with respect to the first 3 months of last year, going from 5.4 percent to 2.44 percent.

The Consorzio Nazionale Acquisti, Coop Italia [the Italian cooperative, the National Shopping Consortium] furnished the statistics.

In the period January-February the total increase over the preceding 6 months was 1.7 percent. For last March (provisional data) the increases are expected to be limited even further. On the whole the price increase in the first 3 months of this year should be 2.44 percent, as stated, compared to the last 3 months of 1981.

Since the increase of the first 3 months of 1981 was 5.24 percent, compared to the last 3 months of the preceding year, it seems clear that the rate of price increases has declined by more than 50 percent.

9772

CSO: 3104/177

KYPRIANOU ON 'MISUNDERSTANDING' WITH GREECE

NC091925 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1630 GMT 9 May 82

[Text] In a speech at a political gathering in Larnaca, Mr Kyprianou, democratic party [DIKO] chairman and president of the republic, has stressed that nowhere in the DIKO-AKEL program is there a contradiction to the joint line that has been charted by himself with the Greek prime minister in their various meetings. With regard to the question that has arisen between Greece and Cyprus, Mr Kyprianou said that this is a misunderstanding. He said: If those who are responsibly handling the affairs are left alone, I do not have the least doubt that this misunderstanding will be lifted very easily. If this was not merely a misunderstanding but something else which was much more serious, obviously things would be different. However, he continued, I do not believe that other things are involved because I am certain that I would have been briefed accordingly by the Greek prime minister.

Mr Kyprianou stressed that he will continue the same tactics of responsibility and sangfroid until the harmonious cooperation between the governments of Greece and Cyprus is fully restored. He also said that his recommendation to all is that the friendly and brotherly climate toward Greece and its prime minister must be preserved. He stressed: Neither that climate nor our friendly intentions must be disturbed.

Regarding the Cyprus issue, Mr Kyprianou reiterated that the faits accomplis of the treachery and crime will never be accepted.

CSO: 4621/330

BASIC FREEDOMS DISCUSSED AT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

NC131751 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1630 GMT 13 May 82

[Text] A new meeting within the framework of the intercommunal talks was held at the Ledra Palace Hotel this afternoon. During the meeting, a discussion of the three basic freedoms--movement, settlement and property--was continued.

In statements prior to the meeting, Gobbi, the special representative of the UN secretary general in Cyprus, mentioned that today's meeting would probably be the last, with the possibility of one more discussion of the three basic freedoms. He added that after concluding the discussion on this issue the interlocutors would start the discussion on the composition of the government. Gobbi mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, Onan, submitted four [as heard] documents on the question of the basic freedoms.

The representative of the Greek Cypriot side, Mavrommatis, stated he expected today's meeting would conclude the discussion on the three basic freedoms and added this does not mean that the interlocutors will not return to discuss the issue again. Mavrommatis added that he would present the reply of the Greek Cypriot side to the ideas of the Turkish Cypriot side on the matter.

On being asked to comment on the ideas of the Turkish Cypriot side, Mavrommatis said much discussion is still required and that the interlocutors are not much closer than what they were in the past. We are still facing difficulties, he added, while we have not managed to reach an agreement on the matter.

The representative of the Turkish Cypriot side, Onan, said that on the question of the return of refugees his side is following the four guidelines of the Makarios-Denktaş agreement and is taking into consideration other constitutions which, as he said, incorporate regulatory measures on the questions now being discussed during the talks. Onan said it is unjust, in his own words, to say that the Turkish Cypriot side is intransigent because, as mentioned, it has not raised any obstacles to anything.

Answering a question on whether this statement means that the Turkish Cypriot side accepts the return of a number of refugees, Onan said it has accepted in principle the three basic freedoms so that they can be incorporated into

the constitution, and that nothing has been excluded in principle. It is a question of discovering the regulatory measures and of how to implement these principles bearing in mind the practical differences.

Onan explained that one of the documents he submitted deals with the criteria for implementing the three basic freedoms, the other is a comparative study of the constitutions of other federal states, and the third is a study on the European convention and human rights.

CSO: 4621/330

GOVERNMENT PAPER CRITICIZES AKEL-KYPRIANOU BEHAVIOR

NC092133 Athens EXORMISI in Greek 9 May 82 p 12

[From the "Political Issue" column: "Deplorable Slanderers"]

[Text] The government's immovable principle regarding the Cyprus Republic's internal problems is nonintervention in the sense of abstention from any suggestion on the course of political developments. However, it is the inalienable right of every Greek citizen, from the first to the last, to be interested in these developments, comment on them, and express an opinion, all the more so since all of Greece has been mobilized for a struggle of support, at all levels, for our Cypriot brothers, and for a pan-European and worldwide campaign for an equitable solution [of the Cyprus problem] whose basic prerequisite is the withdrawal of the shameful and ruthless invaders from the victimized island.

If the well-known agreement between Akel and Kyprianou's party annoys the overwhelming majority of the Greek people--because there is a discordant minority--it is only because at this moment Kyprianou is president of the Cyprus Republic and this agreement--which allegedly will be implemented in the case of electoral victory--is not attuned to the declared common principles between Athens and Nicosia because it is inconceivable that one set of things is to be implemented in the period up to the elections in Cyprus and another after them in case the AKEL-democratic party front wins. This is what it is all about and not, allegedly, anticommunism or, allegedly, the downgrading of a party that represents a great part of Cypriot Hellenism.

All of the above concerns the expressing of an opinion on the well-known agreement. However, there is another issue. It concerns the shameful contumely of AKEL--Kyprianou's partner--against the Greek Government and the Greek prime minister, his equation with those who led Cyprus to its current tragedy, the deplorable equations with Denktas, the extreme rightwing and the representatives of the West's imperialists and other wretchedness.

We understand the nervousness of AKEL's leadership over pan-Hellenic feelings not for AKEL's positions on the national issue, which are very well known, but for the one-sided and unnatural union with Kyprianou who at this moment is president of all the Cypriots and who, in this capacity, talks with the Greek Government and addresses himself from international rostrums to all the

people of the world. We understand the nervousness of AKEL's leadership, which even manifests itself with threats for a renunciation of the agreement, so valuable to it, something we do not greatly believe it will do. However, we do not understand and do not tolerate the contumely against the Greek Government and its popularly elected prime minister unless it concerns a conscious and planned attempt--and not a loss of temper--to undermine the valuable pannungal consensus, an indispensable condition for the auspicious conclusion of the gigantic effort which Andreas Papandreou has embarked upon for an equitable solution of the Cyprus problem. It is an effort he is implementing every day, every moment, and which he does not intend to downgrade regardless of whether he encounters similar deplorable incidents which cannot be covered up by discordant shouts and the riddled cloak of alleged intervention in the internal affairs of the Cyprus Republic.

We also do not understand how it is possible for the president of the Cyprus Republic to tolerate--up to this moment--such contumely against the Greek prime minister to emanate from his new political comrades.

It is being stated that Kyprianou's noble and easily understood aspiration is to continue offering his services to the Cyprus people and the national cause from the position of president of the republic, but not at the cost of any sacrifice.

CSO: 4621/330

OFFICIAL REPLIES TO KKE DEPUTIES ON AWACS

NC131644 Athens ELEVETHEROTIPIA in Greek 13 May 82 p 2

[Text] Greece's participation in NATO's AWACS program has been dictated by serious reasons of political expediencies, which are directly related to the known issues concerning the operational control of the Aegean, so that there will be no arguments that would strengthen Turkey's claims in this area.

The above reply was given by Deputy Defense Minister Dhrosoyiannis to pertinent questions by KKE deputies A. Ambatielos, K. Vasalos, Dh. Mavrodhoulou, M. Dhamanakis and K. Kappos.

Mr Dhrosoyiannis also said the following:

The Preveza airport, which has been chosen to provide facilities for a NATO detachment of the AWACS force, is and will remain under Greek administration to primarily serve national operational requirements.

The same reply also stressed: We categorically declare that the aircraft (flying radar) in the AWACS program have absolutely no connection at all with nuclear armament.

CSO: 4621/330

POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF HAMBURG ELECTION VIEWED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Apr - 1-2 May 82 p 14

[Report by Gert Kistenmacher: "Will the 'Eternal' Senat Be Toppled?--SPD and CDU Almost Even--Greens and FDP Will Make it Hard for a Majority To Be Formed"]

[Text] Hamburg, 29 April--The decision by Walther Leisler Kiep, mayoral candidate of the opposition CDU of Hamburg, to stay in Hamburg even if his party should not attain its objective of a political change in the 6 June parliamentary election has robbed the Social Democrats, worried about their majority, of an important election campaign argument. Now they cannot devalue him any longer as a "politician in transit: who after a lost election would instantly use his already bought return ticket to Bonn. Rather SPD leading candidate Klaus von Dohnanyi and his party friends now will have to take into account the fact that in the pending "hot phase" of the election campaign Kiep's longer-term Hamburg engagement is increasing the chance of the hitherto rather weak CDU to become a strong political force, a "Hanseatic CDU," as Kiep, already sure of victory, has described his party's transformation. Even before his decision to personalize the efforts for a political change with his permanent presence, the SPD and CDU, with about 43 percent of the vote each, were running neck and neck in voters' polls. The optimism of the Christian Democrats to the effect that perhaps they will be able to add some further percentage points in the parliamentary election and then cause a change in the guard together with the FDP is based on political developments of the past few weeks. According to the very latest polls, however, whichever party happens to have announced a poll result is the one that has a slight lead.

The defeats of the Social Democrats in neighboring Schleswig-Holstein (municipal elections) and Lower Saxony (Landtag election)--and, in the process, above all their landslide type of losses around Hamburg--have made it frighteningly clear to the Hamburg SPD (if it had not already surmised it long since, following the internal party squabbles extending for several months) that it is definitely impossible to count any longer on a repeat of the grand election victory of 1978. At that time, with 51.5 percent of the vote (compared with 37.5 percent for the CDU and 4.8 percent for the FDP), it had attained a clear absolute majority under Hans-Ulrich Klose of 69 out of 120 seats in the Land Parliament. At the Bundestag election it even managed to increase its success (51.7 percent), while the CDU dropped to 31.2 percent and the FDP, which 4 years before had missed jumping the 5-percent parliamentary hurdle by only about 2,000 votes,

went into euphoria with a dream result of 14.1 percent. But all that is snow of yesteryear.

The climate around Hamburg is also considered an unequivocal barometer of the political weather in Hamburg, and it includes more lows than highs as far as the SPD and the Free Democrats are concerned. In the latest elections in the two neighboring Laender, from where more than 170,000 "commuters" go to work in the metropolis on the Elbe every day, the CDU around Hamburg made disproportionate gains while the SPD, particularly in sizable towns, dropped even lower than the respective Land average. The causes of this trend are seen by leading officials of the Hamburg SPD not in Hamburg but in Bonn. They therefore doubt that it will be possible to reduce this psychological mortgage by the time of the parliamentary election. Actually the Social Democrats are not so much concerned that previous SPD voters might wander off to other parties; what worries them much more is the realization arrived at in the two elections that people who had been inveterate SPD voters refused to voice their confidence in the party by not going to the polling booths.

To Stop the Trend

In some ways the initial situation as far as the pending Hamburg elections are concerned remind one of 1974, when the SPD likewise found itself in a serious crisis nationwide and suffered heavy losses not only in Schleswig-Holstein, which then too had provided the overture with municipal elections, but almost everywhere. (In Hamburg the SPD at that time dropped from 55.3 to 44.9 percent and was forced to enter into a coalition with the FDP. The CDU, on the other hand, managed to increase its share from 32.8 to 40.6 percent.) In order to stop the current trend which has become apparent in the neighboring Laender and to prevent the kind of losses that occurred in 1974, Dohnanyi and his fighters want to keep grand Bonn politics and internal party disputes out of the election campaign to the greatest possible extent. Instead, in the hometown of Helmut Schmidt, where according to the polls the "chancellor bonus" no longer has its former power of attraction either, they intend to address local sentiments of loyalty with an almost stubborn "Let us show them regardless of the odds" by putting across to the 1,230,000 people entitled to vote (including 55 percent women) an aggressively positive Hamburg image. After only 1 year in power, Dohnanyi can already register some positive results. Whether Kiep can offset this "incumbent's bonus" in the few weeks remaining before the election appears more than doubtful. But problems such as unemployment, questions of energy, protection of the environment and policies concerning foreigners, for which the CDU has no readymade solutions either, possibly are still standing in the way of Dohnanyi's effort to block the anti-SPD trend by means of a clear policy and a fair election campaign. Meanwhile, for a start, he has quite cleverly wriggled out of the dilemma which his predecessor, Hans-Ulrich Klose, had gotten himself into in the Brokdorf question.

Just as it is safe to predict that the SPD will lose its previous absolute majority, so the indicators for the election of a new Hamburg Parliament and 7 district parliaments (in which, the way things stand at present, 14 parties and groupings intend to participate) are diffuse and full of unpredictable factors. Judging by opinion polls, one can arrive at a result for 6 June in

which, aside from roughly comparable results for the SPD and CDU, the Liberals might get 6 percent, and the Green-Alternatives (GAL), who after laborious procedures have formed a joint list, 8 percent.

It is not difficult to conclude from such forecasts that mathematically there can be no majorities in this case and that for the first time a four-party parliament is a possibility. Previously only the SPD and the CDU have been represented in parliament. But the about 6 percent being forecast for the FDP include 3 percent added from among as yet undecided voters, so that the FDP can rely on only about 3 percent in the way of loyal party voters.

While the SPD and the FDP time and again have confirmed their intention to enter into a mutual coalition after the election, the Liberals' coalition statement under certain conditions providently leaves open other possibilities. For example, in case a much weakened SPD should not be able to muster a majority for forming a government even with the help of the FDP, they want to make their contribution "to the possibility of a Hamburg government." The proviso being that Hamburg's votes in the Bundesrat [federal upper house] are not used to block the policies of the SPD-FDP federal government. Otherwise the FDP intends to go into opposition. In case the election result should fail to give the SPD and FDP a majority, or the FDP should not manage to get back into the parliament, Klaus von Dohnanyi would depend on the good will of the very Green-Alternatives of whom he said only recently, "They don't exist as far as I am concerned." It was duly noted, however, that he qualified his stand shortly thereafter by saying that he definitely took Green opinions, Green concepts and also Green votes seriously "because substantively often the right questions are posed there." The CDU thereupon presumed that the SPD evidently was figuring on a minority Senat tacitly tolerated by the GAL. As a condition for such a Senat makeup, the GAL, however, has made "indispensable demands" such as dissociation by Hamburg from nuclear power, which makes SPD cooperation with it appear impossible. Dohnanyi has stated repeatedly that (despite the ambiguous decision concerning a withdrawal from Brokdorf in the long run) Hamburg needs a power supply based on nuclear power.

The CDU and the FDP do not want to have any truck whatever with the "third force." Those scorned, in their turn, have no plans as far as these parties are concerned. They want to assume the role of opposition and do not want to "become the coalition partners of any established party." In the event, however, that they come up with more deputies than the FDP, they nevertheless would be a possibility as the "procurer of a majority" for an SPD minority Senat. The extent of the political instability the election result could entail if the forecasts are correct is shown by calculations on the part of psephologists. If the FDP does not manage to jump the 5-percent hurdle, the CDU could not govern against an SPD and GAL in opposition. If the FDP managed the hurdle and joined hands with the CDU, the two together would have only about 48 or 49 percent of the votes, with the SPD and the Greens having about 50 percent. If the SPD and FDP form a coalition with not quite 49 percent of the votes combined, the Green tyros in Parliament could torpedo any government decision. So it is really no wonder that particularly behind the scene in Bonn there is talk about the possibility of a grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU.

The Hamburg Constitution, however, has provided for the emergency by conceding a special status to the government of the city state. Accordingly the previous SPD Senat could stay in office in the event that no majority for a new Senat was achieved in the Land parliament. For the Senat is "eternal," as they say so nicely, and elected for an indefinite period--at least until such time as the senators either resign or quit for another reason.

8790

CSO: 3103/462

PAPER VIEWS KOIVISTO APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

PM131505 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 May 82 p 9

[Article by Morten Fyhn: "Koivisto's More Sophisticated Approach"]

[Text] Helsinki, May -The Finnish president neither can, nor wishes to, change the fundamental elements in Finland's foreign policy. But Mauno Koivisto has nevertheless given an impression of an increased Finnish desire to listen to, and take account of, other countries' views on a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. There are traces of more cautious signals to the other Nordic countries, of a new style and a softer tone.

In the few interviews and speeches the president has given since his inauguration almost 4 months ago Koivisto has made special efforts to assure the rest of the world that he will continue along the road staked out by his predecessors, Paasikivi and Kekkonen. That is to say, an unchanged active and peace-promoting neutralist policy with special emphasis on maintaining good and intimate relations with the Soviet Union and Finland's Nordic neighbors.

For outsiders this could seem self-evident, but things are not so simple for Finland. A precondition for Koivisto's being able to pursue an active foreign policy with a personal stamp is that no one--and this means Moscow in particular--should have the slightest suspicion of any change of course.

But within the fixed framework there is some room for maneuver and Koivisto seems to be making use of it. Even during his so-called working visit to the Soviet Union at the beginning of March Koivisto expressed himself in a way which attracted attention. In his speech to President Brezhnev Koivisto did not make use of the phrase "nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area." Instead he spoke of the possibility of finding suitable solutions which could ensure a nuclear-free Nordic area. At the same time he expressed great Finnish interest in the ideas which Brezhnev himself has put forward on the zone issue.

The speech in the Kremlin and several interviews granted to the Swedish media prior to the state visit to Sweden at the end of April have created the impression that Koivisto has a somewhat more flexible view of the zone issue than Kekkonen had. There can hardly be any doubt that the speech in the Kremlin was intended to remind Brezhnev of what he said to a Finnish newspaper about the possibility of certain Soviet concessions in connection with a Nordic zone.

The speech can therefore be interpreted--and is being interpreted by many observers in Helsinki--as a clear call on Moscow to take account of the demands from Norway and Sweden for greater precision about what was actually meant. Also, by not talking about a Nordic "zone" in the Kremlin Koivisto also indicated sympathy with the idea that a broader European solution is necessary in order to ensure that the Nordic area remains nuclear-free and is given greater security.

It must be stressed that Kekkonen also spoke of the nuclear nations' participation in zone arrangements, partly in terms of the necessity of their guarantees. What is new and interesting about Koivisto is that he is stressing this side of the question more clearly than his predecessor. Unlike Kekkonen Koivisto has up to now not said that an isolated Nordic zone has any value in itself and is a useful step on the road to increased security and the progressive removal of nuclear arms from Europe.

In a detailed interview with Swedish radio and television, which is being studied closely in Helsinki, it is striking how often Koivisto makes reference to ideas put forward in the zone debate by Norway and Sweden. Norwegian proposals for attenuation zones [uttunningssoner], for example, or the Swedish demand that the whole of the Baltic must be included in a possible future zone. Or, as a high-ranking Finnish official put it, "Kekkonen never referred to the views of other Nordic countries."

Cautious as he is, Koivisto is careful to avoid answering questions about whether he himself agrees with the Norwegian and Swedish views. He also states that in his opinion it is too early to define what goals the Nordic countries should set themselves concerning the extent of the zone. But he does stress that the Soviet submarine which ran aground with nuclear arms on board in the Archipelago outside Karlskrona last year added increased urgency to the idea of a nuclear-free Baltic, and he himself draws the conclusion that there are important questions attaching to the zone issue which extend beyond the borders of the Nordic countries.

"If you want to understand how Koivisto thinks, you have to study who he makes reference to and what he does not say," an experienced Koivisto watcher pointed out. If you follow this advice you are left with an impression of great responsiveness to the other Nordic nations and a more independent view of how the zone could be established than Kekkonen had. Koivisto is more tentative and also encourages debate.

As president, Koivisto also has the advantage that the zone is first and foremost connected with Kekkonen's name. Koivisto is not bound in the same way by previous moves, at the same time as he has a natural desire to set his own stamp on Finland's foreign policy.

But there are also other circumstances which are new in Koivisto's Finland. Finland, too, has seen the growth of a peace movement for which the politician must also show consideration. This is something new in Finland. In the past the zone was something which the politicians and the diplomats almost had to themselves. Now the people have also started to "interfere in the matter."

Another element whose significance is also difficult to measure is that Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa is also in charge of the Socialist International's Disarmament Committee. Sorsa and Swedish Social Democratic Party Chairman--and probably Sweden's next prime minister--Olof Palme work closely together and are said to have fairly similar views on international questions. There are clear signs that Sorsa wants to play an active role in foreign policy in his role as prime minister.

But according to a widespread view in Helsinki President Koivisto is not as fascinated by Palme as Sorsa is. Nor is the relationship between Koivisto and Sorsa said to be the best, and in Finland it is the president who shoulders the responsibility for foreign policy.

The signals coming from President Koivisto can be summed up as cautious, but significant. Finnish foreign policy will remain unchanged, but an interesting rethink is taking place. "The other Nordic countries, and Norway in particular, would be wise to follow it closely," it is said in Helsinki.

CSO: 3108/103

MORE CONTROL ON GROUPS, INDUSTRIES, JOURNALISTS FORESEEN

Paris LE MATIN in French 7 Apr 82 p 3

[Interview with Michel Charzat by Dominique Burg; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Meeting alone, sheltered from indiscreet listeners and the turbulence of the capital in order to work and prepare for action--the socialist party leadership sought such studious calm when it chose to meet "in conference" in Bougival, Yvelines. Today and tomorrow morning, the 28 members of the secretariat of the PS [Socialist Party], who are to be joined by Louis Mermaz, president of the National Assembly, and Pierre Joxe, head of the socialist bench, will pursue the contemplation undertaken by the party since the setback suffered by the left in the district elections.

The leading officials began the discussion on Saturday, setting forth proposals with a view to correcting the errors in the governmental and party actions. Thus we have a better idea of what the PS expects from the government: greater strictness, firmness and consistency in the planning of economic and social reforms. But the leading committee left a muddled impression: it remains for the PS to define its own field of action and its role, and to stick to it. This task was to fall to the leadership "conference." In view of the current situation, when the movement which carried Francois Mitterrand to power has splintered into multiple if not contradictory attacks, one of the functions of the PS should be to reestablish the conditions for a new rallying of the leftist forces. In other words, to find the means for a new mobilization. The campaigns which the PS is contemplating launching concerning employment, the public sector, education and youth guidance are among the varied means available to the PS for use in achieving this goal, working closely with its political partners.

Michel Charzat (CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education]), national secretary in charge of the public sector, civil service and nationalization, is one of the officials scheduled to launch the discussion at the conference.

LE MATIN: The Socialist Party is demanding more authority in the conduct of business. In and on what aspects should it be exercised?

Michel Charzat: The French people, and above all those who put us in power, expect that the "tranquil force" will see that the choices of the people and the authority of the state are respected. It is the duty of the government to set an example through a better explanation of its activities, and through better coordination of their implementation. This legitimate authority should first of all be asserted in the administration. It is not a question of wanting "heads to roll" and then challenging a given government decision. But real problems arise in certain sectors of the high civil and parapublic service. The government encounters resistance on the part of small groups of high officials who had become accustomed to claiming sectors of the state for themselves, taking over and distributing the key posts among themselves. The government has available a certain number of jobs, at its discretion. It is not an authoritarian act to fill them in a suitable manner.

Firmness is also needed with regard to certain socioprofessional groups which reject solidarity. Can one allow such a large city to be paralyzed for an entire day by the owners of private transportation enterprises?

Finally, authority demands respect for the republican order, if necessary by making clear the activities of a certain right-wing sector, which seems to prefer an extraparlimentary tactic for destroying majority stability.

[Question] Isn't this attitude in contradiction with the desire of the left wing for liberty and self-management?

[Answer] No one imagines that the left wing can limit the exercise of freedom. It is the left wing which eliminated the repressive apparatus of the right wing. But the country needs to rise above the tendency toward corporatist withdrawal, the exacerbation of patronization and protection of the interests of special categories, and the rise of violence in all its forms. This development arises out of the economic and social crisis, but also the cultural crisis. France, the victim of the crisis, was in the process of splintering and fragmenting into closed groups. The workers class itself is subject to this tendency toward social splintering. It is the very negation of solidarity among French citizens: there is a risk that the social bond will break. The change we want to implement through democratic agreement and participation comes up against a weakened civil society. Thus we have an unprecedented situation, wherein a historic experience of profound democratic change is developing basically from the top down, when what was also needed was impetus supported from within the enterprises, neighborhoods and associations.

[Question] What means can be used to remedy this situation?

[Answer] Austerity, in the economic sector first of all. The first encouraging results should be expanded through the relaunching of productive investments, a choice of priorities in national industrial policy, and the mobilization of financial means. Nationalization should be the lever for economic recovery: the national enterprises are our armored divisions in the economic war. They must not be content with succeeding for themselves alone. They must contribute powerfully to the success of the general

counterattack. Thus one can only be astonished at the statements made by the PDG [president and director general] of ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]-Aquitaine, which made it clear that France could consider long-term state-to-state contracts again provided that this would serve the purposes of the enterprise he heads. I am convinced that if we allow the nationalized enterprises to invest in 1983 commensurate with their financing needs, we can guarantee recovery in productive investments. As of the beginning of next year, subcontracting enterprises, in particular the PME [small and medium-sized businesses], will benefit from the fallout from this collective effort. This impetus will increase the efficiency of our mechanisms to encourage private investments.

Rigorous results are needed in the social sector. The government cannot leave it to the "social partners" alone to establish priorities, to implement them, to decide on the modes and rate of change. The owner-operators' class does not seem inclined to facilitate the economic recovery undertaking. The trade union organizations, being divided, do not for the time being constitute a consistent force to propose or implement change with joint responsibility. It falls to the political authority to establish the general outline of the social pact needed among French citizens. The indispensable agreement should make it possible to implement the major options on which the country decides in the field.

[Question] Speaking of rigor seems like a reference to some sort of Barre policy in the social sector!

[Answer] It is just the opposite, because our reforms as a whole come within the perspective of a society with more solidarity, justice and freedom. With decentralization, the new rights for the workers and tenants and the draft law on associations, the democratic advance is already considerable.

The government must clearly assert the consistency and the ambition of this liberating project. The media problem, which often irritates socialists, does not have to do with the journalists so much as the cultural message we should be able to communicate. The PS needs better mobilization in order to promote positive values: democracy, solidarity, a taste for intellectual rigor, collective effort, national identity and independence. To make it clear, for example, that working less also means working better, making better use of machines, and not limiting the use of public services. This appeal can be understood. For it will rely more on measures which will link change with everyday life.

[Question] What measures?

[Answer] What would seem to me to have priority is the effort for the low-income sectors, vocational training, youth and national education. The beginning of the 1982 school year must be marked by significant steps in the direction of construction and creating jobs.

[Question] Can the priority for the most neglected sectors be reconciled with the expansion of the sectors rallying around the left wing?

[Answer] The problem of the support of certain social strata is above all a question of the place and role in the implementation of the proposed national recovery and the democratization of society. For example, the cadres must assume new responsibilities in exchange for the effort of solidarity which may be demanded of them. What is called "expansion" also has to do with ideological trends and preferences. The proposal of a certain future for our country may allow some who saw themselves as Gaullists in the past to join the supporters of the movement. The diffusion of responsibilities may provide a favorable field for experimentation for the most positive hopes underlying the freedom explosion of May 1968. Finally, more fairness, for France and peoples of the Third World, is this not also the requirement of Christian commitment? The dynamics of this mobilization have nothing to do with a tactical operation. It is the mobilization of capacities and wills to achieve goals known to all, in clearly established phases. In brief, it means a joint perspective and a new upsurge.

5157

CS0: 3100/579

KKE OPPOSITION TO HAIG VISIT DISCUSSED

Wary 'RIZOSPASTIS'

NC091751 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 9 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Our People Say No to Haig"]

[Text] Haig will come to Athens next week. The Greek government's original objections have been swept aside. Pressures have produced results. The ground has been prepared...and the Greek people's questions and apprehension are peaking.

Are we facing the chilling prospects of a new "improved Greek-U.S. agreement" which will mortally and for the long term confine our country in the vise of U.S.-NATO imperialism? Are these the prospects that are "being concocted" backstage? Are these the aims of Stearns' "to's and fro's" to Washington which are covered with a veil of secrecy? Has a "give and take" begun to enter the "home stretch" with our national independence as the price to be paid?

The Greek people are deeply apprehensive. They know both what Haig is and what he wants. They also know why he is coming. What the Greek people do not clearly know is what the Greek Government wants and what its aims are.

The government has repeatedly stressed that it wants a timetable for the U.S. bases. Agreed. However, there are timetables for removing the bases and "timetables" aiming at the perpetuation of their presence. Citing authoritative sources, the press has written about a 10-year timetable.... The government has not denied this.... Is this what the government is negotiating?

The government has repeatedly stressed--not only before the elections, not only in its policy statement--that it will immediately and unilaterally remove U.S. nuclear arms from our territories. More than 6 months have passed since Pasok has been ruling, but the U.S. nuclear arms remain. Could it be that this government's promise has also been included in the more general "haggling" with the Americans?

Will the presence of nuclear arms and, more generally, the promotion of the idea for a denuclearized Balkans be put on the table of consultations with Haig?

Pasok had rightfully accused the right that by placing Greece back in NATO's military wing it had abandoned the Cyprus question. What is Pasok doing now as a government? Beyond its declarations, it approves of Spain's accession to NATO. Is this a contribution to peace and detente? Is this a contribution to the cause of a peaceful Mediterranean?

It is surprising that while the government does not proceed with our country's disengagement from NATO, in order to thereby offer inestimable help to the Cypriot people, it goes so far as to intervene in Cyprus' internal affairs and with its commentaries, EXORMISI CONTINUES to pressure and indirectly threaten the Cyprus president.

Why is the government so much annoyed by the democratic party-AKEL cooperation? Is it because "Western initiatives" on the Cyprus problem are thereby made difficult? Could it be that under the term "internationalization" the government means that the Cyprus problem too should be among the issues that should be included among the more general "settlement" of the area's problems, secretly from the Cypriot people?

We shall not be the ones to underestimate certain positive positions in the government's foreign policy, but these positions should not remain as "desperate movements" and on alibi for keeping Greece in "the lions' den."

Haig is coming to Athens, as opposed to al-Qadhdhafi who did not come...and the agenda of Haig's talks with the government will be open. It will include all issues: NATO, bases, Greek-Turkish affairs, the Cyprus problem.... We do not want to discount the government's position.

The people, however, do not haggle over their national independence and their peaceful future. They do not cash them in for any phraseology about U.S. "guarantees," with no content, in any case, for our Eastern borders.

The Greek people will say no to Haig, no to the embellishment of dependence. They will demand measures for the country's disengagement from NATO, for removing the bases, for the immediate removal of the nuclear arms.

KKE Mobilization

NC111430 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 11 May 82 p 1

[Excerpts] Wrath and indignation are being intensified throughout the country at the forthcoming visit to Greece of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig next Saturday. With Athens as the center, all the big towns are feverishly preparing a mass mobilization of people who will welcome the representative of U.S. imperialism and demand our withdrawal from NATO and the removal of the bases and nuclear weapons from our country.

In the meantime, reliable U.S. circles in Athens express their enthusiasm for the "spirit of excellent cooperation," shown by the Greek side.

These allegations by the Americans have actually been confirmed by Prime Minister A. Papandreou himself who, speaking to reporters accompanying him on his visit to Algeria, said that "credibility between Greece and the United States has been restored and this is significant!" Mr Papandreou also added that his government desires the talks with the United States in June.

Preparatory to Haig's arrival, the town committee of the Athens Communist Organization [KOA] of KKE yesterday issued the following statement and appeal:

"U.S. Secretary of State Haig will be coming to our country for discussions on 15 May. This visit is a direct attempt by the U.S. imperialists, through pressures and blackmailing, to maintain and strengthen their overlordship in our country. They aim not only at maintaining their bases but also at extending their role for the purpose of realizing their cold war plans in the area.

"The people's mass mobilization is the sole and resolute answer to these pressures and attempts.

"The KOA town committee of the KKE calls upon all democrats and patriots, all the people of Athens, to declare their opposition to the visit and aims of the 'minister of war' Haig by mass participation in the multifarm activities to be held in Athens.

"To militantly manifest their will as it was expressed through their vote for the democratic forces at the October 1981 elections.

"The bases and nuclear weapons must be removed.

"We must withdraw from NATO.

"The Americans must leave our country.

"To unitedly and resolutely shout:

"--Away now with the Americans and their bases.

"--Our national independence cannot be bargained.

"[Signed] the Town Committee of KOA of KKE.

"[Dated] 10 May 1982."

Government Spokesman's Reply

NC121524 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 May 82 p 1

[Excerpts] President Karamanlis received yesterday U.S. ambassador in Athens Mr Montegle Stearns and discussed with him the question of U.S. Secretary of State Haig's visit to Athens, who will be received by Mr Karamanlis at the Presidential Palace Saturday afternoon.

Referring to the KKE mobilization against the U.S. secretary of state, the government spokesman made the following statement last night:

"Mr Haig has been invited by the Greek Government. He will have important talks here with our country's prime minister on crucial national issues. The government knows how to serve the people's and the nation's interests and it does not accept lessons from those that use them to promote partisan interests."

KKE Clarification

NC132204 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 2100 GMT 13 May 82

[Text] The KKE, referring to Papandreou's statement [on the Haig visit protest], announced that the demonstrations are not directed against a visit as such but against the efforts to ratify U.S. overlordship in our country even after the change of government last October.

CSO: 4621/331

GESTSSON, HERMANNSSON DEBATE HELGUVIK PROJECT, AIR TERMINAL

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 27 Mar 82 p 10

[Article by Bjorn Bjarnason: "Party Leaders Confer: Seriousness or a Joke?"]

[Text] The situation within the government is "far from" being so bad that it ought to resign, said Steingrimur Hermannsson, chairman of the Progressive Party, on the radio program "A Vettvangi" on Wednesday evening. The government "has been unusually successful in solving problems," said Svavar Gestsson, chairman of the People's Alliance, on the same radio program. Hermannsson felt, however, that people within the government had "different ideals," but that problem was solved at the ministers' committees. Gestsson, on the other hand, mentioned "poisonous arrows" and "poison issues" whenever he thought about his colleagues in the government and their policy.

Then the party leaders began to discuss the Helguvik issue.

Gestsson: "One of the main reasons for the dispute (about Helguvik) stems from the fact that the plan is that the Americans and NATO will build a harbor, a communications project, financed by American money, in Helguvik, a project which will be used by the Icelanders. I am opposed to using American money for communications projects which will be used by Icelanders. I am not prepared to agree to that..."

Hermannsson: "With regard to what Gestsson said about the harbor, I want to state that I am not ready to take funds from Icelandic harbor appropriations and pay for landing facilities for the Defense Force. I believe they should pay for that themselves. It is another story altogether, as in fact has already been demonstrated by the foreign minister, for example, that this harbor, which is outside the 'agreed area,' will sooner or later be subject to Icelandic harbor laws. Of course there are precedents in that other parties have financed such projects. Take Straumsvik, for example: The harbor there was paid for by the Swiss but is adjunct to and operated by the Hafnarfjordur harbor."

This exchange of words between the party chairmen must come as a surprise when one considers what they and their party colleagues have said about these matters up to now. The public in general believes that there have

been disagreements within the administration whether to build new fuel tanks for the Defense Force. But now it appears that the dispute is in fact about whether the Icelanders are to have access to the harbor that is being planned within the Keflavik territory in Helguvik. Is it the intention of Minister of Social Affairs Svavar Gestsson to apply his planning authority and forbid the Icelanders from using this harbor? What about harbor fees? Does Gestsson, in his capacity as minister of local affairs, intend to prohibit Keflavik from collecting the fees? Will the next phase in this dispute be between Gestsson as minister of planning and Hermannsson as minister of communications and thereby as minister of harbors?

The position of the People's Alliance in this whole affair seems stranger yet when one considers that by its veto power within the administration the People's Alliance prevents final decisions regarding the construction of a new terminal at Keflavik airport. The reasoning is the same as Gestsson's regarding the harbor in Helguvik: American money must not be used for communications projects that will be used by Icelanders. If this rule was to be followed thoroughly, Icelanders should, of course, not use Keflavik airport, which was built with American money. Let alone the runway, which was lengthened with American money, when the People's Alliance was in the government from 1971-1974. And what about Reykjavik airport? It was originally built with British money.

The issue of building a terminal is in deadlock because of this view held by the People's Alliance, and if something affirmative is not done soon, it might so happen that the \$20 million appropriation which the American Congress has agreed to grant for the construction of a new terminal, in response to repeated requests by Icelandic governments--among those have been governments with ministers from the People's Alliance--will be cancelled. Maybe Svavar and his colleagues will come to the conclusion that it will be possible to use the harbor in Helguvik as a terminal!

The conversation between the party chairmen about the "wonderful" government cooperation did not end with this "unanimous" position they took about the project in Helguvik. Steingrimur Hermannsson emphasized that the Helguvik issue was being studied for a final decision by the foreign minister who in turn was basing his decision on a parallel parliamentary resolution from the spring of 1981. Svavar Gestsson was then asked if his party was prepared to break the government coalition because of the Helguvik issue.

Gestsson: "I feel that this question...is not actually on the agenda at this time and this has never really come up. The primary question in this case is: Are people prepared to follow the game rules, the work rules, which this administration works by and the coalition agreement it is supposed to follow. Whoever breaks the game rules or that coalition agreement obviously is breaking the coalition cooperation. We have no intention of doing that. If, however, other parties do that, we will, of course, take measures. The basic point in this is, Sigmar, that no projects have been decided on for Helguvik (!), although Olafur Johannesson has decided that there will be designing there, research, and so on. No projects have been decided on. That is an issue that came up later."

Unfortunately, the interviewer did not follow up on this answer, so that the audience was not any closer to knowing what the chairman of the People's Alliance meant. What "game rules" is he talking about? Is it the famous secret agreement he wrote about in a newsletter to his party colleagues a year ago? Does the chairman of the Progressive Party interpret the parliamentary resolution to mean that the foreign minister's authority regarding the project is limited to design and research?

Then the chairman of the People's Alliance was asked whether the rumor was correct that his party was just waiting for an opportune moment, such as the results of the wage negotiations, to dissolve the government.

Gestsson (with authority): "The People's Alliance is not in the government for this kind of speculation. Perhaps it appears so from the mass media, but the People's Alliance is not in the government for such speculation. We are in the government for specified issues, which are agreed upon each time, and we totally reject such insinuations."

Then the wage negotiations were discussed.

Steingrímur Hermannsson said that the government was not going to influence the wage negotiations directly until it became necessary and that all the coalition parties had to agree. The national economy could not support the 13 percent wage increases over 2 years as demanded by the Icelandic Federation of Labor [IFL]. Productivity and increased national product was needed. Other points should be discussed during the wage negotiations: "the era" of electronics is ahead. How is that to be dealt with? The wage earners' movement is interested in discussing these matters.

As it is, the Progressive Party is not very influential in the wage earners' movement. Nobody should doubt, however, that the party's spokesmen will be successful among wage earners when they preach the message from the party chairman and the minister of fisheries, that at a time when there has been a loss of the capelin stock, an alloy plant is operating in the red and the Nigerian market may conceivably be lost, it makes the most sense to discuss electronic techniques with employers.

At the 17th Congress of the Soviet Confederation of Trade Unions, the newly elected president, S. A. Shalayev, said when speaking about his leader: "The Soviet public loves you dearly, Comrade Brezhnev, because of your perseverance, because you are definitely a man of great importance to the nation..." Without a doubt the chairman of the People's Alliance deserves such praise in the estimation of his party colleagues in the IFL. When the wage negotiations were discussed during the radio broadcast Wednesday evening, Svavar Gestsson said that it was not possible to negotiate 13 percent base pay increase "across the board"; it would be "incorrect and unnecessary"; the high-income people, the broad backs, would have to "wait." But this was not the point of Svavar's argumentation but the following:

Gestsson: "In my opinion, our main problem in economic affairs is to realize that we are surrounded by unemployment and signs of a serious

depression. I believe it must be the main task of Icelandic politicians and the Icelandic Government to protect the nation from these symptoms of depression before they ascend upon us with full force."

It is interesting to note that Gestsson did not oppose the statement made by the interviewer, Sigmar B. Hauksson, that the inflation rate was now 55 percent, and that Hermannsson, chairman of the party, did not protest either. Besides, the inflation is not the main problem in Iceland's economic affairs but "threatening unemployment and very serious depression signs" abroad. It may be concluded from this conversation with the party chairmen that it is probably best to avoid these shocks from abroad by discussing electronic techniques during the wage negotiations.

Finally, the survival of the government was discussed.

Steingrímur Hermannsson said that his hope was that the government would last until the elections. There would be some unrest around the local elections. There was a great desire within the government to solve disputes--if the government survived the local elections, it would make it through the term.

Without a doubt, the chairman of the Progressive Party had in mind these words from the editorial in THJODVILJINN on 23 March, the day before the radio program. "It is also clear that the outcome of the local elections will have considerable effect on the position and survival possibilities of the government... A victory for the People's Alliance in the local elections will strengthen the position of the government, but a victory for the opposition means a demand for a new government under their leadership and then probably without the participation of the People's Alliance." How are the Progressives going to fight in the local elections under such a threat? Will the slogan in Reykjavik be: Clear majority! and thereby a request that people vote for the People's Alliance, and not for the Progressives or the Social Democrats?

Regarding the government's likelihood of survival, the chairman of the People's Alliance said:

Gestsson: "We are firm in our decision to try to do whatever we can to maintain the government through its term of office, as people will respect the coalition agreement and the main guideline this government will follow."

There is a famous statement of Ólafur Jóhannesson in which he said that people ought to read the coalition agreement of his first cabinet every morning and every night. There seems to be need now for Jóhannesson to point out this rule to his fellow ministers and, at the same time, omit reading the secret agreement that is so near and dear to Svavar Gestsson. The cornerstone of the coalition agreement of Gunnar Thoroddsen's government is to get the inflation in Iceland down to the same level as that of our main trading partners.

BERLINGUER'S SPEECH ON DC CONGRESS IN CHIETI

PM131053 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 May 82 pp 1-2

[Report by Ugo Baduel on PCI secretary general 9 May speech in Chieti:
"Berlinguer in Abruzzo, Talks About DC Congress"]

[Text] Chieti--The recent DC Congress reversed the outcome of the previous congress, as far as the composition of the DC leadership group is concerned, but failed to take the decision to take a new political path. This, in short, is Comrade Enrico Berlinguer's verdict on the DC Congress, which has just ended. The PCI secretary general proceeded from this appraisal to a series of observations about the country's political situation, on the socioeconomic crisis that it is experiencing and on the international framework in which it is developing. Berlinguer is spending 2 days in the Abruzzo. Here on 6 and 7 June there will be local government elections in several municipalities including Sulmona. Yesterday he had meetings with the comrades, the new working class, of the industries that have emerged in recent years in the Sangro Valley, with small farmers and many others. He visited Chieti, Scalo, Archi, Tornareccio, Atezza, Paglieta and San Salvo. Speaking in Atezza and San Salvo the PCI secretary general first replied to the people--in the press and in other parties--who have tried to, or claimed to, identify in the communists' first comments on the DC Congress a renewal of credit in that party, with a view to a return to the national solidarity period and prospects of government cooperation with it.

Berlinguer described it as "a surprising suspicion," especially since it comes from those who have always governed with the DC, or who have at least done so for a long time or in recent years and who have helped strengthen its power system by broadly participating in it, and who now aim to remain within it in the future too by continuing to cooperate with the DC always.

The communists have not cooperated in government with the DC since as far back as 1947, when the political balances that led to the resistance, the founding of the republic, the formulation of the constitution and post-war rebuilding were broken. Ever since then the PCI has combated the power system and government methods dominated and imposed by the DC.

Admittedly, there was the phase of national solidarity, and Berlinguer discussed it, recalling the positive aspects of that period, but also its negative aspects which at one point prevailed, eventually prompting the

PCI to decide to withdraw from the majority of which it was a member together with other democratic forces and with the DC. We said then, and we repeat, the PCI secretary general said, that we consider that experience closed. We now have a different plan: It is to create a democratic alternative capable of extricating the country from its economic and political crisis and to provide it with a government different from the ones that have hitherto succeeded each other and from the ones that the five parties of the present coalition continue to contemplate, despite the fact that they are purely and simply variants of the same political and social alliance.

Having clearly stated this, Berlinguer added, it would of course be absurd to presume that a party such as ours should not watch with interest what is happening within the DC and especially what happened at its recent congress. We are a force which, on account of its weight and the political education that it has experienced through its modes of action and struggle, does not limit itself to condemnations and propaganda, but which acts in relation to current processes and the forces in play, taking account of their changes, developments and contradictions. And this is one way in which the balance of forces is altered, currents of opinion are created and new solutions are prepared for.

Berlinguer referred to the latest PCI Central Committee session, when it was clearly stated that a distinction must be made between government alliances, which imply clear accords on a program and on specific objectives, and the kind of convergences--to which the communists are always open and which they seek--for particular objectives which should be shared by broader alignments of democratic forces, within both the majority and the opposition, such as the defense of democracy and of the foundations of the constitution; the struggle against terrorism, the Mafia, the Camorra and infiltrations by P2 [Masonic lodge]; and the peace struggle.

The PCI secretary general cited two examples of this kind of convergence, which is useful and should be developed: The case of the Comiso missiles base, for the construction of which all the governing parties declared their agreement but against which several representatives and parliamentarians of the PSI, the Italian Social Democratic Party and the DC subsequently spoke out, supporting Sicilian demands for the suspension of work on the base; and the case of the anti-Mafia struggle--in opposition to those groups and individuals within the DC and certain other government parties which are bound up with the Mafia by ties of interest, mutual protection and perhaps even blackmail--a struggle which is shedding light on other groups and individuals of the DC, of the Catholic world (consider the Italian Association of Catholic Workers) and of the church hierarchy (Cardinal Pappalardo) who openly denounce the conspiracies and crimes of the Mafia and side against it, like we communists, who have for this reason witnessed the death of our Pio La Torre and Rosario Di Salvo. In these struggles, as in others, the broader the front can be made, the greater the chances of victory.

The PCI secretary general proceeded from these two examples to a more general observation. It would be an outright defeat, he said, if the PCI were to neglect its ability to combine its representation and initiative within

society (its capacity for mobilizing the masses) with its ability to act within the institutions and vis-a-vis the parties, taking account of whatever differences of posture emerge among them and from within them, in order to isolate the most reactionary forces and to encourage the most open minded and regenerative ones--the interconnection of action at all levels which Togliatti used to talk about. It would be all the more absurd to lose this ability amid factors that are partly the result of our policy and of the struggles that we have waged.

Next Berlinguer recalled what has happened in Italy since 1979. The other parties raised the banner of "governability," which it was intended to establish without and against the PCI. But there has never been a more unstable and inefficient period than the past 3 years, in which there have been four governments, all continuously afflicted and rendered unstable by continuous and more and more acute struggles among the parties supporting them. These governments have certainly not improved the country's situation, still less the workers' situation, and this is why the communists have combated them consistently and determinedly, proposing different solutions in line with the needs of the people's masses. Now, moreover, the failure of "governability" has become so glaring that it is acknowledged even by some parties that used to support that line so enthusiastically.

Next Berlinguer referred to the recent DC Congress (expressing the verdict which we reported at the start) and analyzed its results. There was a defeat for the "preamble" line which emerged victorious in 1980 and therefore for the overall political blueprint designed to achieve a stable political solution of a conservative stamp for the Italian situation. In order to guarantee the essential maintenance of the social balances, that sector of the DC was prepared even to pay the price of a socialist prime ministership, in the belief that eventually it would have been possible to wear down the PSI and deprive it of its characteristics as a leftwing party.

The majority of the DC has reacted against this plan, which was centered on Forlani--and it did so prompted partly by anxiety about yielding positions of power threatened by PSI rivalry and partly also because some of its sectors refused to allow the DC to be considered a purely conservative party.

This explains, Berlinguer said, why at the DC Congress there was a victory for a composite group which forced the forces that still identify with the "preamble" line (from Forlani to Bisaglia, Donat Cattin, Colombo and rumor) into a minority. So there is an innovation that must be acknowledged but, at the same time, there is a gap and a fundamental contradiction.

The gap lies in the fact that the DC leadership group failed to say which specific solutions it proposes to Italy's pressing problems, starting with the economic and social ones. Virtually no mention was made at the DC Congress of employment, labor contracts, pensions or housing. For instance, not a word was said about the attitude of the Italian Confederation of Industry, which threatens to ignore the indexing system, which refuses to

negotiate labor contracts and which aims to attack the gains of years of trade union struggles. On such issues--which forebode harsh social conflicts--the PCI's position is clear: Open and determined backing for the interests and aspirations of the workers and trade unions. But the DC--even the DC that won the congress--has failed to adopt a stance on this issue.

The new DC secretary, Berlinguer continued, centered his speech on another topic: The "new state philosophy" ["nuova statualita"]. What is that? What on earth does it mean? Of the torrents of words spent on this subject we note that not one was said about the issue central and vital to our republic and the democratic state--namely the occupation of the state by a sector of the DC and its allied parties and the spreading practice of cronyism and sharing-out of positions of power, which affects all areas of the country's economic and social life. And yet this is in fact the main cause of the malfunctioning of the insittutions and the decline of the state, of its most delicate constituent bodies and institutions, to the extent of their pollution by P2.

The fundamental contradiction lies in the fact that once again the proposal for Italy's Government--albeit "for now"--is the same five-party formula, whose disunity has become more and more obvious, especially since the start of this year, as is now admitted even by representatives of the DC, the PSI and other coalition parties. Berlinguer recalled the remarks made at the PSI's Rimini conference, the growing tensions, the famous charges and counter-charges of [DC Treasury Ministry Nino] Andreatta and [Socialist Finance Minister Rino] Formica (of "national-socialism" and the "murderous party") and the PSI's harsh verdict on the DC Congress. What is the point of continuing to propose an alliance based on such precedents and such premises? he asked. According to them, the prospect now seems to be either to keep this increasingly inadequate and paralyzing majority alive or to hold further elections. But what would be the point of elections if the government parties can only propose a repetition of the same solution that has already proved a failure?

To continue this way might perhaps serve those parties (but I do not know how much and for how long, the PCI secretary general pointed out), but it would certainly not serve the country. It is we communists who want to change things, Berlinguer said. And this means building an alternative aimed at a change of political approach, in the solution of problems and in government methods.

Of course everything cannot be changed at a stroke, but it is nevertheless necessary to begin the change with precise actions and pointers. And this applies particularly to the relationship between parties and institutions, between the government and the parties, between the state and the parties, in order to surmount the occupation of the state and the sharing-out of the controls of command by the parties. This is the crux of the matter--the evil network that generates not only corruption, but also the decay of the state, the citizens' loss of esteem for the authorities and for the parties, wastage and the stifling and enfeebling of activities and of economic life.

How can the democratic alternative line be advanced? The only way that is definitely futile is to wait for the others. The wait-and-see attitude spells death for any policy line and once again it is appropriate to cite what [deceased PCI Chairman Luigi] Longo said on the eve of the resistance movement: "Motion comes from movement." We communists must therefore move, we must mobilize the masses for specific, real and heartfelt objectives affecting everyone's daily life and future and concerning peace, employment, housing and every aspect of people's lives. And it is necessary to create the unity of the sound and openminded forces, both inside and outside the parties, around these objectives.

We believe, Berlinguer added, that broader and broader scope is now opening up for the initiative of the PCI, which is, and wants to be, the driving force behind the democratic alternative. Pressure in this direction is being exerted by the actual state of affairs, by people's dissatisfaction and the workers' and young people's aspirations. However, the policies pursued over the years by the other parties have all unfailingly reached a state of crisis, which should prompt those parties to carry out reappraisals, which we must facilitate and encourage. There is a crisis in the policy of the "preamble" DC, a crisis in the blueprint being pursued by the PSI and a crisis in the hypothesis of the so-called "secular pole."

It is said of us, Berlinguer concluded, that as a force, we are hors de combat. In fact those who say this have already had to, and will increasingly have to, come to terms with us communists, with our ideas and proposals, with the energies of the workers, intellectuals, young people and women that we are able to mobilize. This strength of ours is the hope for the country's recovery and regeneration--and not because we communists enjoy some kind of grace or because we are immune from defects and errors, but because, in contrast to the parties that want to restrict political struggle and activity to elite maneuvers and interplay, we represent the party that constantly thinks and acts to involve broad masses of workers and people. This is the special nature of the PCI; this is the role that would like the other people's parties to play, each with its own specific ideological and political heritage.

CSO: 3104/205

PCI'S PAJETTA ADDRESSES ALGIERS CONFERENCE

PM101543 Venice L'UNITA in Italian 6 May 82 p 20

[Unattributed report on PCI International Affairs Department Chief Gian Carlo Pajetta 5 May speech at Algiers Conference of Mediterranean Progressive Parties: "Pajetta's Speech"]

[Text] Comrade Gian Carlo Pajetta, who heads the PCI delegation to the Algiers conference, began his speech by expressing our party's condolences and solidarity to the Algerian Government and the National Liberation Front [FLN] Party over the death of Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia.

Proceeding to the subjects on the agenda, he expressed satisfaction with the opportunity provided by the FLN for a meeting that can be of great importance among different political forces--communist, socialist, liberation movements and progressive forces.

Next Pajetta took a panoramic look at the conflicts that are making the present situation dangerous. These conflicts have recently been joined by decisions likely to further increase anxieties: The establishment of a nuclear missile base at Comiso in Sicily and Spain's admission to NATO, despite the opposition and resistance of the Spanish people's forces represented here. Moreover, the decision taken by some Mediterranean countries to send armed forces to Sinai seemed to us not without danger and condemnable. This act involves them in the dangers created by the U.S. presence in the territories returned to Egypt, as if it were intended to present the liberated territories as a bridgehead for U.S. forces alien to the zone itself.

Next Pajetta asked whether it is possible to consider the Mediterranean issue in terms of the proposal of intermediate solutions and therefore the quest for gradual objectives. We believe that it is, he replied. Is there a problem regarding the withdrawal of non-Mediterranean fleets? Let us first consider the more immediate and difficult problem--but one which we must succeed in resolving in the short term--the denuclearization.

Proceeding next to matters regarding cooperation, he said that the European Mediterranean countries must promote, within the EEC and the European Parliament, a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

Next Pajetta expressed the Italian communists' opposition to the pressures of the blocs policy in this area and issued an appeal for cooperation: If independence is a valuable asset for all I believe that nobody must consider acting alone, nobody must consider excluding the others from guarantees of security and cooperation. This is why we Italian communists would have welcomed representatives of Israeli peace-loving forces here and we hope that they can grow in their country to combat the present government's aggressive and expansionist policy. This also applies to Turkey, primarily in the interests of its people and in the common interest. Let us not forget it and let us not allow it to be forgotten. We hope that the Albanian Republic will be represented at a future meeting. We want nobody to isolate themselves or to be isolated by others.

His closing remarks were addressed directly to the governments. We remind whoever has forgotten it of the Venice declaration, Pajetta said. We say to those governments that it is necessary to be more explicit and not to be contradictory in specific policy. Let us remember meanwhile that this sea also wets the shores of what must become the Palestinian state, if there is to be at least a hope of peace in this sea.

CSO: 3104/205

HEAD OF FARMERS UNION INTERVIEWED BY 'LE MONDE'

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Apr 82 p 2

[Interview with Giuseppe Avolio, a former Socialist member of Parliament and president of Confcoltivatori, by Jacques Grall; time and location of interview not specified]

[Excerpts] In the opinion of Mr Avolio, a former Socialist member of Parliament and president of Confcoltivatori, the second largest Italian agricultural organization, this de facto unity in the French agricultural movement is an asset that should not be wasted. Although no parallel between the two countries can be established, his reflections on the Italian situation are also enlightening for France.

"To Reassure and to Know how to Talk"

Mr Avolio: It isn't enough to give the farmers what they want. You also have to win their confidence. In order to reassure them you have to know how to talk to them. The Italian left lost the fight in 1945, in the countryside. In France, the government is in trouble, not in industry but in the countryside, where, however, it has already given more than the preceding government. To reassure and to know how to talk requires considerable theoretical planning. It has taken us a long time to do it, and we still don't agree on understanding that, if we wanted to have credibility with the farmers, we would have to present ourselves as something other than a leftist organization.

LE MONDE: This isn't easy, considering the origin of the forces that formed the Confcoltivatori.

Mr Avolio: That's right. In 1977 three organizations decided to merge. There was the Alleanza contadini [Peasant Alliance], which was influenced by the PCI and the PSI, the Tenant-Farmers Federation, which at that time was affiliated with the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], and one part of the Italian Farmers Union, which was socialist. Today, our organization is the second largest in Italy. Why? Because, unlike the others, we were eager to be independent of parties, trade unions, central and regional governments, and because we want to maintain parity relations with all parties and also with the other unions, which are still linked with political movements. The Coldiretti says it wants to be detached from Christian Democracy, to become autonomous, but in its texts it confirms its respect for the social-Christian inspiration of the DC. The same is true of the Confagricoltura, which is

close to the Liberal Party, but its president, Mr Diana, was elected to the European Assembly on the DC ballot. Moreover, the Coldiretti, which for 30 years has been dominant among small farmers, is worried about the breach the Confagricoltura is causing in its troops. As for us, we are refusing to make an ideological choice. We want to be the point where all forces meet, simply a professional organization, for the protection of income, but also--and this why all the forces are needed--for rebalancing agriculture and industry, the countryside and the city.

LE MONDE: Every union organization defends, as you do, the thesis of autonomy, of its strictly professional character.

Mr Avolio: Yes, but we are the only ones who are not really tied to any party, and at the same time we seek unity, because in this country, agriculture has been marginalized because its representation has been divided. This search can only take place if there is no ideological wall.

LE MONDE: Concretely, how is that unity demonstrated?

Mr Avolio: The three organizations have agreed on criteria for representation. For example, at the time of the division of the property of the fascist organizations which has just been done, we obtained one quarter of the patrimony. The three unions together have set up a rural tourism organization, which is a small beginning. And then, we are requesting membership on the Organizing Committee of the European Agricultural Organizations (COPA).

LE MONDE: What does that have to do with unity?

Mr Avolio: All right, the European Commission recognizes COPA as the sole interlocutor. The only means, therefore, of defending the farmers' interests is to be a member of COPA.

When COPA was created, the socialist and communist organizations were kept isolated. That was an ideological, not a professional reflection. Before Confcoltivatori [Farmers Confederation] was formed, the organizations that were not members of COPA had been brought together at the European level in the COMEPRA [expansion unknown], a kind of leftist COPA. We thought it necessary to dissolve it, because there is no reason for us to accept being different from the others, with fewer rights than the others.

LE MONDE: But you aren't still a member of COPA.

Mr Avolio: We have been asking to join COPA for 3 years. There has been no official response. If it is a purely professional organization, we must be in it, and if not, COPA must say why not. If they refuse to admit us because we come from the left, that means COPA is rightist. The former chairman of COPA, Baron von Herreman, the president of the German Farmers Federation, acknowledged the merit of our application, even while indicating that a new union could only be admitted with the unanimous agreement of the COPA members from the state under consideration.

LE MONDE: In that case, MODEF [Movement for the Defense of Family Farms], which in France is also asking to get into COPA, would have to obtain the agreement of the FNSEA [National Federation of Unions of Farm Operators].

Mr Avolio: MODEF in France is on a different basis from our organization. We had already been recognized by the government, and we accept the idea of Europe and its expansion. But you tell me that MODEF wants to get into COPA. Well, the FNSEA will say no. On this point the situation is the same as in Italy.

LE MONDE: There is no solution.

Mr Avolio: I reject the idea of several organizations being formed, at the European level. That would be a negative for agriculture. At the national level, it was historical circumstances that made union pluralism, but everything must be done to prevent politicization of the agricultural union movement, because the divisions that ensue are prejudicial to agriculture, as clearly shown by postwar history in Italy. As long as we are not in COPA, we are asking to be received and listened to as if we were, by the European Commission, its president, Mr Thorn, by Mr Dalsager, the commissioner in charge of agriculture, and by Mr Piet Dankert too, who is president of the European Assembly.

But, once more, we believe that COPA must be the organization of all farmers. If we go into it, we will accept the majority positions and will accept being a minority, because I am a visceral optimist: I think I can go in there and influence the rest. Unity is necessary in Italy so that agriculture will be effectively integrated into the national economy. It is also necessary in Brussels.

8946

CSO: 3100/591

POLITICAL

ITALY

BRIEFS

BERLINGUER MEETS DUTCH LABOR PARTY OFFICIAL--Rome--PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer has met with Marteen Van Traa, member of the Dutch Labor Party [PVDA] leadership and chief of its international section. In the course of the lengthy and cordial conversation, in which Comrade Romano Ledda of the Central Committee took part, there was a broad exchange of ideas on the problems of the left in Europe, with particular reference to the development of the European movement for disarmament. Comrade Van Traa, who is in Rome at the invitation of the Foreign Policy Studies Center [CESPI], has held at the CESPI a crowded lecture and debate on the PVDA's program and domestic and international policies. [Text] [PM101537 Venice L'UNITA in Italian 7 May 82 p 13]

CSO: 3104/205

LABOR PARTY VIEW OF NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY CRITICIZED

PM121451 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "On False Premises"]

[Text] In yesterday's foreign affairs debate in the Storting voices from the Labor Party advocated a reevaluation of NATO's nuclear strategy and its right to "first use" of nuclear arms. For fairly obvious reasons the intention was to indicate a strongly attacking approach, and on behalf of the party's Storting group Guttorm Hansen put forward a proposal urging the government to raise the matter in NATO's councils. The striking thing is that despite this involvement in support of changes in current NATO strategy there was not a single Labor Party speaker who felt even a vague need to mention the consequences the party's approach would have for our own national defenses. No one in the Labor Party even wanted to touch on what must be a major concern for government and Storting—the question of what effect the abandonment of NATO nuclear strategy would have on vital Norwegian security interests.

The total absence of any discussion of this question says much about the obvious tactical considerations behind the Labor Party's move.

Of course no one is opposed to NATO's defense strategy being subjected to an almost continual reassessment in the light of strength levels and of developments in arms technology. And indeed, this is what happens in practice. For our own part we find it natural that the alliance's defense strategy is also discussed in detail in competent political bodies here in Norway. But we must--out of respect for the country's interests--stipulate that this discussion is not pursued on false premises. And here we express our reservations about the Labor Party's way of doing things. If a change in the NATO doctrine of first use of nuclear arms is to become at all possible, we would need--as the Conservative Party's Jo Benkow and others pointed out--a colossal buildup in our conventional defenses. We would need a form of rearmament to which many of those now raising new questions about nuclear arms and strategy would be opposed.

The Labor Party /knows/ [word italicized] that neither Norway nor other European NATO nations have the economic or political foundation for the massive increase in defense expenditure which would be necessary to create balance with the Warsaw Pact at its present level. This means that the

conditions for a change in attitude to the first use of nuclear arms do not exist. Responsible Norwegian politicians should at least be able to agree that a change in NATO's defense strategy cannot be considered until there is a real alternative capable of meeting our fundamental security needs. And the Labor Party also has a responsibility to see that confusion is not created around this point.

We agree that the long-term objective must be to reduce our dependence on nuclear arms. To reach this objective we must work with all our strength for balanced, verifiable and regularly monitored disarmament. Today the situation is such that despite varying ways of counting, the balance has clearly swung against NATO. And development trends point in the same direction.

CSO: 3108/103

GARAICOECHEA: NAVARRA MUST REMAIN BASQUE

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 13 Apr 82 p 9

[Text] The restoration of Navarra as the heart and root source of Euskadi, an appeal made to Herri Batsuna [Popular Unity] to support the Basque government, and criticisms of the LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomies Process] with a veiled threat to "break the rules of the game," were the most outstanding features of the speeches made by Carlos Garaicoechea on the occasion of this year's "Alberri Eguna," [Basque Fatherland Day] the 50th anniversary of its founding. Also noteworthy was the scanty attendance by the "Navarran" public who came to listen to the Basque president.

(News summary from our office.)--The president of the Basque Government, Carlos Garaicoechea, emphasized this weekend in Echarri Aranaz (Navarra) that Navarra is the heart of the Basque Country, when he said, "We cannot imagine a Euskadi without Navarra, its historical root and stem, since Euskadi would then be like a table without the mother's chair."

The position of the Basque president is a new one. As is known, he is a native of Pamplona. In Echarri Aranaz Garaicoechea presided over the rally held by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] on the occasion of "Aberri Eguna," Basque Fatherland Day, which was attended by some 1,000 people.

In spite of the "institutional" stamp which was given to the day by the Basque government, it is certain that an "Aberri Eguna" with so many divisions in the ranks had never been celebrated.

The PNV organized various rallies in Navarra, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Aleva, which were characterized by a festive nature and by political speeches, especially those made by Garaicoechea, who spoke in the four provinces.

In the rallies they emphasized references to the incorporation of Navarra into Euskadi, the controversial law of the historic territories, the internal unity of the PNV, criticisms of the LOAPA, criticisms of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]. There were even representatives of the Polish "Solidarity" union present, who made reference to "national independence."

Navarra

On the subject of Navarra, Garaicoechea told barely 1,000 persons in Echarri Aranaz, "I proclaim my respect for democratic methods and for the institutions, among which I include the Navarra institutions which have democratic intentions."

Regarding improvement of the regional privileges law code he said, "I hope that we nationalists may have the opportunity to uphold authentic improvement of regional privileges integration, since we want this people to regain complete political power. We will carry our demands for an improvement of conditions in Navarra to their ultimate conclusions--with tooth and nail."

"The fact," Garaicoechea finally concluded by saying, "that there are two separate institutions is not going to constitute a barrier to the growth of a common national consciousness," referring to the Basque government and the Navarra Regional Deputation.

Criticisms of LOAPA

In the rally at the Anoeta pelota court in San Sebastian, both the Basque president and the president of the PNV, Xavier Arzallus, criticized the LOAPA. Garaicoechea said, "If the balance with LOAPA is being upset, let them be aware that we know how to face the consequences. Two years ago we gave up some of the share that we could have gotten in order to reach a difficult equilibrium in a statute which, in some ways, was not satisfactory to us."

He referred to the need not to retreat in developing the Basque statute and in dealing with nationalist aspirations, and cited the Polish situation as an example to reflect on, "because," he said, "the struggle for a free Euskadi will be worthless if the law of the jungle prevails, or if there is any kind of tyranny in it."

"If the rules of the game are broken," threatened Carlos Garaicoechea, "they will be broken for everyone."

In the speeches made by the different orators the accusations of internal divisions within the party were rejected, and there were criticisms of Popular Unity. Garaicoechea regretted the banning by the civil governors of the functions put on by Popular Unity. He also accused this organization of stirring up problems for the Basque government: "They say that we are a phantom government, but then they call on us to resolve their problem for them," said the Basque president, and he added, "We call on Popular Unity to support the Basque government."

Ceremony in Bilbao

Some 10,000 people attended an all-day gathering in Bilbao in the fairgrounds area. They put on demonstrations of rural Basque sports in the morning, and listened to political speeches in the afternoon. Arzallus referred on several occasions to the coup mentality in Spain: "Among us there are individuals who favor coups, and who want to return to the old days. They have us under observation; they want to finish us off." Garaicoechea said in Bilbao, referring to the bill relating to historic territories: "For months they have been waiting for us to destroy ourselves with this law. The PNV is not going to be broken up by this law. No one is going to enjoy seeing that sight. We will find out how to come to an agreement among ourselves." As is known, the project has brought about a confrontation between the Basque government and the Basque deputations (dominated by the PNV).

Overall, in his various speeches, Garaicoechea struck a balance between accusations and criticisms of his conduct at the head of the government. He praised the "fortitude of the Basque people," and said of the PNV: "this solidity rests on three basic points: their ethical concept of politics, in which the end does not justify the means; their promise to transform this society without destroying it, without converting Euskadi into "scorched earth;" and their faithfulness to the slogan "Euskadi is the homeland of the Basques."

Celebration in Vitoria

In Vitoria the Alberri Eguna "was organized by the municipality, and was the most festive one of those celebrated, with rockets, parades, txistulari bands, cabezudos [carnival figures with big heads], sports competitions, fireworks, as well as the political rally in which Garaicoechea, Arzallus and Alava leaders also took part.

Other Celebrations

In Bermeo (Vicaya) some 500 people attended the rally held by the "Euskotarrak" organization, made up of individuals who have split off from the PNV.

The independentist tendency of the group was evident, and there were references to the ideology of the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana.

At the pelota court at Gallarte (Viscaya), Euskadiko Ezquerria [Basque Left] organized a function which was attended by some 400 people, and in which Juan Maria Badres, president, and Roberto Lertxundi and Xavier Marquiegui, members of the executive board, took part.

Bandres said, "The Basque nationalist cause has made progress since 1975, but we are far from having obtained the full self-government which our people need." He criticized the festive atmosphere of the day, and called instead for the people to assert their claims. "The Basque Right has put on its second "alderdi eguna" (PNV Party Day), when this day belongs to all the Basques."

Critical references were made to the Basque Right, and to the Spanish Government. Bandres denounced "irregularities" in the trial of the events of 23 February; unemployment, "which causes us wrath and indignation," and the "cuts in autonomy made by the LOAPA."

Finally, Bandres made reference to human rights, criticized those who do not bear them in mind, and asserted: "No matter what group they belong to, as long as one Basque prisoner remains in jail, the Basque people will not be fully free; and as long as they still go on torturing in this country, we will continue to have no peace."

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CSO: 3110/117

PROGRESSIVELY LOWER VOTER TURNOUT SEEN IN ANDALUSIA

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 26 Apr 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Joaquin Prieto]

[Text] The Andalusian area has had a relatively stable electoral pattern in the legislative and local elections held up to now. The Left as a whole has represented about 50 percent of the electorate in the various contests whereas the Center and Right have lost some of their strength, dropping to 38 percent in 1979. The surprises were always on the side of nationalism, which scarcely played any role in the first democratic elections and, subsequently, showed various kinds of behavior depending on the type of contest being held, from huge successes to considerable losses by the PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] in the last partial elections which were held. All this was in keeping with the constantly decreasing popular participation which reached a breaking point with the emotions aroused in the voting of the autonomous referendum of 28 February 1980.

In the first years of the transition to democracy, the form of the Andalusian vote was more consistent than that of other areas in Spain. The polls of this area reflected the socioeconomic variables of the electorate better than those of other areas: labor voted for the Left, management for the Right; leftist and rightist blocs had clearcut dividing lines, and vacillation of votes was rather confined within those blocs. But the autonomous referendum of 28 February called attention to unknown quantities with regard to the electoral interpretation of nationalism--whose maximum exponent was the PSA--and brought about the transfer of centrist votes to other parties.

Various conclusions may be drawn from the results obtained in the general elections of 1977 and 1979 and the municipal elections of the same year--which are the three contests in which direct competition among the political parties became evident:

Marked Drop in PSOE Vote

In the midst of the present wave of optimistic expectations for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], the assertion may seem strange that the socialist

trend in Andalusia has been that of losing rather than gaining votes. And yet, the figures speak clearly: of the 1,040,402 citizens who had voted for the PSOE on 15 June 1977, more than 200,000 failed to do so in the municipal elections of 3 April 1979. In the partial elections for the senate in 1980, the socialists lost more voters, although they achieved a relatively good recovery compared to the rest of their competitors.

UCD Losses

The Democratic Center Union [UCD] was the party which received the most votes in Andalusia in the municipal elections of 1979. Although the leftist pact reduced the centrist influence and infrastructure in the area's local institutions to a minimum, it is certain that the UCD slates and assimilated independents attained slightly more than 32 percent of the votes in Andalusia as a whole, compared with 30 percent for the PSOE.

This example shows that a broad centrist electorate existed in Andalusia during the first years of the democracy. Between 1977 and 1979, the UCD lost votes in six of the eight Andalusian provinces (Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva and Sevilla) and obtained slight increases only in Jaen and Malaga. And in the local elections this party continued to lose votes; however, the general decline in participation enabled it to remain the foremost party. The partial elections for the senate showed the disastrous situation achieved by the centrists at the end of 1980.

PCE's Relative Gain

On 3 April 1979, date of the municipal elections, the PCE received almost half a million votes in an area whose active electoral body amounts to little more than 2.5 million citizens. In contrast to the PSOE's and UCD's experience of losing voters, the communists gained 150,000 followers between the first general elections of 15 January and the municipal elections of 3 April 1979. The PCE never ceased to be the third party, but the gap between it and the others was gradually reduced.


The PSA's Ups and Downs

The big news of the general elections of 1 March 1979 was the extremely big drive by the sector which carried the flag of Andalusianism. The PSA had competed in the first democratic elections in coalition with Enrique Tierno's party the PSP [People's Socialist Party] and, therefore, without a recognized nationalist image. The coalition came off badly at the polls, and the PSOE not only became the number one party but also clearly asserted its image as a socialist force of great standing in Andalusia. The PSA's change of tactics in the following contest, stressing nationalism, proved to be very profitable for that party: compared with the votes obtained by the PSA-PSP coalition in 1977, the socialists-nationalists in 1979 quadrupled their electorate in Huelva, tripled it in Sevilla (where they obtained 101,601 votes, almost as many as the PCE and half of those obtained by the PSOE) and doubled the electorate of Cadiz and Malaga, in addition to slight increases in the rest of the provinces.

Nevertheless, the PSA increase can be considered irregular: it more than doubled its electorate between the first and second general elections--to the point of exceeding 300,000 votes in the area as a whole--and then lost 80,000 in the municipal elections, that is, in the short period between 1 March and 3 April 1979. It should be noted that the PSA did not have any candidates in one-fourth of the municipalities, and this contributed to the aforementioned loss of votes.

Substantial AP Decline

The section of the Right which, in 1977, competed in the elections in the form of the Popular Alliance [AP] and, in 1979, as the Democratic Coalition [CD] was drastically reduced: of the more than 200,000 followers as of 15 January, the number dropped to 39,000 in the municipal elections of 1979. As in the case of the PSA, it should be explained that the AP also had no candidates in many localities.



Key: 1. Andalusian General Elections of 1 March 1979.
Participation: 2,979,099 (69 percent)

The above chart gives a comparison in the votes obtained by the principal political forces in Andalusia in the last general elections of March 1979. The four charts below, arranged by provinces, give the detailed development of the vote among the four parties which have the most strength in the area up to now. These charts do not reflect the results of the partial elections held for senate seats, whose disastrous result for the UCD, coupled with the obvious disobedience of the centrist electorate in the referendum of 28 February 1980, may be the harbinger of important changes in the next results.

PSOE Development (percent of votes cast)				UCD Development (percent of votes cast)			
Province	15/6/77	1/3/79	3/4/79	Province	15/6/77	1/3/79	3/4/79
Almeria	27	37	31	Almeria	50	44	42
Cadiz	36	30	30	Cadiz	27	29.5	29
Cordoba	34	30	27	Cordoba	32.5	30	29
Granada	32	36	28	Granada	44	37	39
Huelva	34	35.5	30	Huelva	47	37.5	34
Jaen	39	42	39	Jaen	32.5	34	36
Malaga	39	36	31.5	Malaga	27	29	25
Sevilla	37	29	26	Sevilla	32.5	28	29

PCE Development (percent of votes cast)				PSA Development (percent of votes cast)			
Province	15/6/77	1/3/79	3/4/79	Province	15/6/77	1/3/79	3/4/79
Almeria	6	7	8	Almeria	3	3	3.5
Cadiz	10	11	17.5	Cadiz	10	20	13.5
Cordoba	16.5	19	24	Cordoba	4	10	8
Granada	10	13	15	Granada	4	6	7
Huelva	5	7	10	Huelva	2.5	10	6
Jaen	9	13	15	Jaen	2	3.5	2
Malaga	12	13	18	Malaga	5	12	11.5
Sevilla	13	16	22	Sevilla	5	15	13

Note: In 1977, the PSA had a coalition with the PSP. (Enrique Resel)

After 1979

All electoral polls and studies agree that the Andalusian political map was substantially changed from the time of the autonomous referendum of 28 February 1980. Since then, no new election has been held--except the partial elections for the senate in Sevilla and Almeria--and we therefore do not have reliable figures concerning any change in the support received by each party. However, the aforementioned referendum produced such an obvious breakdown in the discipline of the centrist vote that it can only be doubted that any substantial changes were reported.

Since the double electoral process of 1979, some of the more significant data are the following:

Breakdown in the UCD Vote Discipline

The Center Right's appeal to abstention in the referendum of 28 February 1980 turned out to be a big failure. Although the Left and nationalists officially lost the referendum, the political outcome of the vote for the parties per se was possible, according to authorized interpretations, only because of the failure of part of the centrist electorate to follow the abstentionist recommendations of its party. The Popular Alliance had also remained aloof from the referendum, but its scant implantation in the area and its modest position as fourth party on the national level--2 years were still lacking until the Galician parliament elections, a culminating point of the Fraga takeoff--were such that the responsibility for the political failure of the abstention fell almost entirely on the shoulders of the government of Adolfo Suarez and on the leadership of the centrist party.

Initial estimates made after the referendum of 28 February 1980 relegated the UCD to a fourth-rate role in Andalusia. If one compares the differences between abstention (and the blank vote) registered on 28 February 1980, and the support the UCD and AP had obtained in the general elections of 1979, one sees that more than half a million citizens were allegedly disloyal to these parties. But, by the same token, one should not put absolute credence in these exercises of automatic interpretation whose value is only that of indicating a trend.

Substantial Reduction of the Centrist Vote in the Partials

The partial elections to the senate in the following autumn showed that the estimate of the loss of centrist votes was accurate, at least in the provinces involved--Sevilla and Almeria. The PSOE won the three offices being contested. The big upsets were by the UCD, which failed miserably in Sevilla and lost half of its voters in Almeria, and the PSA, which gave up 63,805 votes in Sevilla and was only able to compensate for this situation with modest gains in Almeria. The PCE lost votes, but most of its electorate was loyal to it.

Partial Recovery by the Right

Until now, the AP has not shown itself to be an important party in Andalusia, although the partial elections to the senate indicated a certain amount of recovery in gaining votes while the others were suffering general losses due to abstention (57 percent in Sevilla and 55 percent in Almeria). Still weaker is the electoral strength of the extreme Right, if this sector can be held accountable for many of the negative, void and blank votes (more than 250,000) which showed up in the referendum for ratification of the statute.

Increase in Abstention

This change in the vote shows that the electorate of the Right and Center has gradually decreased in Andalusia, while the leftist parties and nationalists increased their influence, sometimes competing with each other. But the Andalusian analysis would be incomplete if we did not consider the gradual increase in abstention during the various elections. And, although in the legislative elections of March 1979, for example, more individuals voted than in those of 15 June 1977, the population has been increasing and, therefore, the abstention is greater.

Participation was manipulated in the referendum of 28 February 1980 for autonomous initiative. As is known, the maneuver to add the abstention of the Center Right to the gradual apathy of some of the Andalusians ended in a failure on the part of the government. However, it was the only election, in turn, in which there was a break in the trend toward declining participation. Without considering the partial elections to the senate (which affected only provincial participation), abstention in Andalusia, which scarcely exceeded 20 percent in the elections of 15 June 1977, already amounted to 28 percent in the municipal elections of 1979 and surpassed the level of 46 percent in the referendum for ratification of the statute in October 1981.

It is true that the October 1981 referendum was less significant in evaluating the change in participation. Held in an atmosphere of little political enthusiasm and without significant confrontations among the parties, the various

campaigns were carried out lukewarmly, both because approval of the election would require only a simple majority of affirmative votes and because they were being held at the same time as the primary elections to the Galician parliament. A total of 53.49 percent of the population voted, a higher percentage than that of the Galician election--despite the fact that the latter involved competition among parties--but less than the 64 percent of the citizenry entitled to vote who came to the Andalusian polls on 28 February 1980.

Both electoral participation and the change in the vote appear far from having achieved a stable phase in Andalusia. This has undoubtedly been partially influenced by the varied nature of the elections held since 15 June 1977: two general elections, one local election, one partial election to the senate, one constitutional referendum (preceded by that of political reform) and two autonomous referendums.

It is entirely possible and even probable that the results of the next elections to the autonomous parliament will reveal some changes with regard to the previous situation.

Political Abstention in Andalusia
(percent of population)

Province	Ref. 12/76	Elec. 6/77	Const. Ref. 78	Elec. 1/3/79	Munic. Elec.	Auton. 28/2/80	Ref. Stat. 20/10/81
Almeria	18	23	33	34	42	49	56
Cadiz	19	24	30	34	44	39	49.5
Corodoba	17	19	25	27	32	30.5	38
Granada	18	23	31	31	37	37.5	49
Huelva	19	22	30	36	39	39	47
Jaen	19	21	28	28	33	37	42
Malaga	20	25	32	36	45.5	41	48
Sevilla	19.5	18	28	29	36.5	27	45

Note: Most of the percentages of the vote have been rounded off inasmuch as there is often variation in the figures supplied by the various sources (administrative organizations and electoral teams of the principal parties).

The Next Elections: A Very Proportional System

The next invitation to the polls in Andalusia is on 23 May. Its autonomous nature does not conceal the extraordinary importance of this election to the country's general political situation, and the most interesting aspect is to find out if the electorate will liken this vote to general elections or will continue to act in accordance with guidelines which are more clearly autonomous.

With regard to 23 May, one thing should be pointed out: the system called for fairly well guarantees proportionality among the various candidates, at least within each of the provinces. Therefore, the principal options in competition will have an opportunity to see rather well the electoral strength they have in the seats of the Andalusian parliament.

This good relative proportionality is due essentially to the number of deputies to be elected in the various provinces, as follows: Almeria and Huelva, 11 each; Jaen, Granada and Cordoba, 13 each; Cadiz and Malaga, 15 each; and Sevilla, 18. The most reliable studies on electoral systems have reached the conclusion that, above 10 deputies, a fairly proportional representation is obtained. In previous legislative elections less persons were elected for each subdivision and there was much scattered voting among small parties (about 6 percent of the total). Now more deputies are elected per province--in view of the provisions of the statute--and perhaps the scattered vote is less of a problem. Therefore, the picture of the overall opinion of the electorate will be much more precise.

Alleged "al la Greek" Movements

Valorizations of each party on the elections of 23 May are not based so much on the change observed up to now as on previous polls. Elections have not been held in Andalusia for 3 years--not counting the partial elections to the senate in 1980--and, since then, the only indications are obtained through polls and analyses. PSOE experts anticipate good prospects for their party and do not even preclude an "al la Greek" or "a la French" movement, that is, a widespread shift of the electorate to the socialist camp, although the party's leadership makes frequent appeals to moderate any feeling of triumph (they obtained 36 percent in 1977, their best result to-date). There are possibilities for the socialists from other camps but not so extensive.

Centrist circles are more prudent with regard to the UCD's possibilities, although they believe that the final result of the campaign will permit them to play an important role. The PSA appears to have lost some of its electorate of past years, but it may draw the youth vote, and certain recent polls grant a considerable number of positions. The strength of the PCE is unknown after the crisis it suffered and the internal problems in its own Andalusian organization, one of the entire party's strongest; the good infrastructure the party has in Andalusia enables communist experts to evaluate the PCE's possibilities in the next elections, whereas other parties have to give greater consideration to the extent of their internal crisis.

Lastly, the A is now better enveloped in its national image, but its Andalusian infrastructure is weak. The latter is greatly inferior to what it had in Galicia, which gave such excellent results to the party in the elections to the autonomous parliament.

8568

CSO: 3110/120

SAUDI DAILY INTERVIEWS TURKISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

GF180600 Jidda AL-MADINAH in Arabic 15 May 82 p 10

[Interview granted by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to AL-MADINAH correspondent in Saudi Arabia--no date given]

[Excerpts] Question: The third Islamic summit conference noted the need for economic integration among the Islamic countries. To what extent do you think this recommendation has been realized?

Answer: I often hear the view that the way to this development is represented in economic relations among the Islamic countries and that it is not easy for two Islamic countries to establish a common market. This objective is somewhat far off, but it is necessary to establish regional systems to encourage exports and imports.

Question: How far can the government remedy the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey? What is the timing set to achieve this?

Answer: As I have told you, the Turkish economy achieved great development in the past 2 years. Specifically, we were in an extremely difficult situation in 1979 when the economic situation was deteriorating and inflation reached 100 percent. We did not have enough hard currency to meet our needs and terrorism was rampant in the country. We managed to set up a successful economic program and the army was able to crush terrorism in September 1980. After that the economic situation began to improve. Inflation was reduced from 100 percent to less than 30 percent, the volume of exports expanded, and national production and income began to increase. The country's needs were being met. The success which our government achieved is considered to be great progress. We are continuing this program until we resolve all economic problems, God willing.

Question: The Iraq-Iran war has continued for a long time. How do you view the danger of its continuation and the latest developments?

Answer: It is very sad that war between Iran and Iraq has continued for such a long time. It is very sad that mediation efforts exerted by many sides achieved nothing. When the war began some people thought that it would be short because Iran was weak and its armed forces had disintegrated, but after

a week it was announced that the war would be a long one. The continuation of the war is regrettable because both sides are now killing Muslims, disgracing Islamic lands and dissipating their energies. Who benefits from this war? Who sells them the equipment, materiel and ammunition? The only beneficiaries of this war are the Western countries and the USSR. They benefit during the war and after it, when the two sides will need to reconstruct what has been destroyed and spoiled by this dirty war. Therefore, it is in the interest of both Iran and Iraq to end this war immediately or it will be very costly. The real danger is that it weakens the Muslims' ability to confront their enemies and the enemies of Islam.

Question: Turkey has declared its willingness to mediate between Iraq and Iran to end the war. How does Turkey view such mediation?

Answer: We are friends of Iran and friends of Iraq. We have very good relations with both countries and this favors the mediation because there will be no chance of bias toward either one. This could lead to real mediation.

Question: Turkey is known for its clear stance regarding the Palestinian issue. It always stands alongside Arab rights. How do you explain the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel?

Answer: Some people misunderstand the level of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel. There is only one person with the rank of third secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Ankara. The same situation applies to our embassy in Tel Aviv. This explains the level of our diplomatic relations. We have no trade or economic relations with Israel. There are countries which have no diplomatic relations with Israel but very good trade relations with it, such as Japan.

Question: Your excellency deputy prime minister, what is your opinion about Fahd's Middle East peace plan? What positive points do you see in it for a resolution of the Middle East problem?

Answer: Israel's ambitions are clear and known and the Israelis are continuously and repeatedly announcing them. They want to expand. What is sad for us is to find the Arabs disunited in their stance. This worries us. In our view, Prince Fahd's initiative, which won wide support on both the Islamic and international levels, really represents one of the important pillars of establishing peace in the region. The latest incident which took place in al-Aqsa mosque was condemned, but we ask: what is the value of this condemnation, which represents nothing more than a political show? What we need is a real effort. Supporting Fahd's initiative is in itself our best hope of demonstrating our desire to resolve the issue.

Question: With regard to the U.S. bases in Turkey, some sources have reported that the United States wanted to expand them after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. What is your stance on that and do you see the presence of these bases as a necessity to create balance?

Answer: These are clearly not U.S. bases. They are bases of NATO, in which our country is a member. These bases are called NATO bases. Let me tell you one thing: Turkey protects the southern flank of NATO. We have a commitment to protect our territories. It is quite simple to tell you why Turkey joined

NATO. After World War II communist Russia claimed some parts of Eastern Anatolia as well as two of the Turkish regions. We refused and Russia warned to declare war on us. That is why we joined NATO. We wanted partners capable of protecting our lands and the countries situated to the south from the Soviet threat. Turkish troops in NATO represent the greatest force after the United States. We consider Turkey as a barrier to communist penetration of the Arab countries that are situated south of it.

CSO: 4604/32

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST POLITICIANS REPORTEDLY INTENSIFIES

Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 May 82 p 4

[Text] Ankara--The recent speeches by head of state General Evren, in particular on 25 April, on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Constitutional Court, gave formal guarantees as to the "democratic content" of the future constitution. Somewhat reassured, the political figures awaiting the return to normality, the progressive minds who have never had ties with subversive movements immediately got together and qualified as "useless and sinister" the process of escalation developed by military justice with regard to the intellectuals and the former politicians.

One of the clearest manifestations of this movement involved Mr Bulent Ecevit, involved in several trials. On 29 April, he was brought before the Ankara military tribunal for having given an interview to SPIEGEL and for having made a declaration to Dutch television. He faced 6 months in prison. But he faces 5 years in another action concerning the "discredit" reflected on Turkey abroad in statements to a Norwegian journalist. Finally, a letter revealed by the BBC may earn him a third indictment.

The trial has been adjourned until 4 June for additional information as Mr Ecevit had asked to be judged on the text of the answers which he gave to SPIEGEL in English and not on the Turkish translation of an article translated from English into German, which is the basis for the indictment.

Aside from the charges made against him for his declarations to the foreign press, three other investigations have been initiated against Mr Bulent Ecevit: The first for "collusion with terrorist groups of the extreme left," a second for complicity with the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions [DISK] and the last for "insulting a judge."

Simultaneously, 76 former parliamentarians of the Republican People's Party (RPP) were called in by the military prosecutors in Istanbul and Ankara. The latter wished to establish whether the RPP had had ties in the past with armed leftist circles and with leaders of the DISK labor union.

Judicial circles are also implicated in these indictments. Military justice will soon judge Mr Burhan Apaydin, lawyer and brother of the head of the Istanbul Bar and Mr Okay Gonensin, editor in chief of the daily CUMHURIYET. They face between 3 and 18 months in prison.

Mr Apaydin is accused of having "defamed" the judge, the prosecutor and the deputy prosecutor of the Istanbul Military Tribunal in a telegram to the Directorate of Military Justice and in a petition to the Istanbul martial law commander last March. He referred to "irregularities" committed in the arresting of the president of the Istanbul Bar, Mr Orhan Apaydin, member of the Bureau of the Peace Association and one of the defense lawyers in the trial of the 52 leaders of the progressive labor union DISK.

The journalist Okay Gonensin allegedly published in the columns of his daily the telegram and the complaint in question where Mr Apaydin accused the Istanbul military prosecutor, Mr Takkeci, of "usurpation of power" and asked for a judicial inquiry against him.

As far as the other ongoing trials are concerned, 80 of the 230 accused members of the clandestine Turkish Communist Party, currently being tried by the Golcuk military tribunal, were freed on 21 April while the attorneys of the group of militants of the Turkish Communist Party being tried by the Ankara Military Tribunal protested the unjustified disciplinary punishments inflicted on their clients by the authorities of the Mamak military prison.

The trial of the militants of one of the very numerous factions of the armed extreme left in Turkey, the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit opened on 23 April in Istanbul. Forty-two out of 114 accused being tried face the death penalty.

CSO: 4619/104

NEW, SUPERIOR AUTOMATIC RIFLE DEVELOPED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 May 82 pp 223-227

[Unattributed article: "Muted Compression"]

[Text] German engineers have developed a new automatic rifle—the first to fire cartridge-less ammunition. The experts call it a revolution in weaponry.

In Oberndorf on the Neckar, a lovely Black Forest town where gunsmith Paul Mauser shot out his left eye 81 years ago while testing a primitive self-loading rifle for Kaiser Wilhelm, it has at last been achieved. "The Germans," the LONDON TIMES wrote, "have invented the magic rifle."

"There is no doubt about the fact that this is the most important development in handguns," said JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS, "since the first breech-loader was introduced"—and that was about 140 years ago.

The words of praise were for the G 11 rifle, a strange-looking thing that seems not to be designed for the trenches but bears a resemblance to a clarinet case. Just the same, the rectangular, olive-green box with a handle that doubles as a gunsight is a technically sophisticated piece of equipment. A designer was responsible for its styling—an unusual procedure in weapons technology.

"We made an exception," said Thilo Moeller, an engineer in charge of development at Heckler & Koch Ltd in Oberndorf who was responsible for the G 11 program. "Once a rifle no longer looks like a rifle, it should at least be stylish, even in the military," he added.

Born in 1937 and thus not a participant in World War II, Thilo Moeller who refers to himself as "neither a gun freak, a hunter nor even the possessor of a gun license" took 15 years to work out the technical essentials that would guarantee the G 11 system a "substantially higher hit probability" than that of conventional automatic weapons.

The new G 11 is the lightest, simplest, shortest and most robust of all automatic rifles. It fires 4.7 mm bullets—the smallest caliber ever used for a military rifle; almost as small as that of a simple air rifle.

Among the decided advantages of the new G 11 which is presently being tested by the Bundeswehr: it is the first automatic rifle to fire almost recoilless bursts; its projectiles can therefore reach the target with a hitherto unattained degree of accuracy.

Just what it is that makes the rifle fire so softly and accurately is still being kept secret by the manufacturer. So far, it has merely been learned that the success of the rifle is based on two basic technical innovations. It has a cylindrical fast-action bolt and fires cartridgeless ammunition made from powder pressings which burns without residue.

Instead of a conventional cartridge where the bullet is grafted onto a metal casing filled with gunpowder, the G 11 projectile is baked directly into a solid, rectangular miniature powder chamber.

In collaboration with munitions experts of Dynamit-Nobel Inc, Moeller and his 160 Oberndorf technicians were able to solve the most vexing problem in the manufacture of automatic weapons. "In a worst case scenario," Moeller said, "the normal course of events is that the infantryman misses his target most of the time."

The reason for it is the up to now inevitable recoil which keeps the soldier from staying on target as he fires long bursts. The cone of fire tends to "migrate," as the ballistics experts call the flight from target which is always directed obliquely upward.

In battles in which old-fashioned, smooth-bore muzzle-loaded rifles were used—as in the 1775 Battle of Lexington in the American War of Independence—it took 17 shots on the average to hit and disable an opponent.

In modern wars—such as those in Korea and Vietnam—which were waged with chattering rifles the automatic firing of which was activated by their own recoil or by gas pressure the "success ratio" declined dramatically. It took 60,000 rounds to disable an opponent.

According to all military experience, aimed single shots almost always miss their target due to stress on the part of the rifleman and sighting errors. For this reason, the new H & K rifle offers an additional "automatically limited" three-shot burst "with defined dispersion." "This causes at least one shot of the burst to reach its target and to disable the opponent," the manufacturer says.

This is made possible above all by the new and sophisticated "cylindrical bolt system." Since each shot takes only 30 milliseconds, the system moves so rapidly that "the rifleman feels no recoil against his shoulder," as Moeller says. In the case of sustained fire, the manufacturer believes there will be "practically no recoil" which in turn will make for greater accuracy of the G 11. An expert testing the rifle for WEHRTECHNIK could still feel "a muted pressure," however.

The short, unorthodox "propellant charge" which can be fed to the bolt system very easily from the 50-shot magazine because of its rectangular shape also plays a big part in the rapid firing sequence.

"Many of the weapons used by NATO could soon become obsolete" because of the new rifle, said the London OBSERVER. Compared to the large-bore (7.62 mm) NATO G 3 rifle with its 20-shot magazine, which was also developed by Heckler & Koch, the new G 11 is not only superior with respect to its firing properties.

The smaller caliber and the omission of the heavy cartridge casings make the G 11 lighter to carry. Even with 100 shots of ammunition, the G 11 weighs less than the G 3 without a single cartridge.

In addition to that, the G 11 is the only automatic rifle which does not have an opening for cartridge ejection. It has no "Achilles heel" in other words through which water and dust can enter.

After a 600-year span during which flintstones, powderhorns and even bite-off cartridges were used (in the 18th century) the gunsmiths did not succeed until early last century in developing an entirely new type of rifle. It was Nikolaus Dreyse, a locksmith from Thuringia, who introduced his needle gun complete with uniform cartridge in 1836 which turned out to be the first usable breechload rifle.

The new rifle attained a firing rate three times as high as that of the then conventional muzzle-load weapons. Austria's military men, who were offered the new weapon, were afraid that the needle gun would tempt their soldiers to waste ammunition. They turned the offer down, but their avarice was to cost them dearly. The Prussians defeated the Austrians in 1866 at the Battle of Koeniggratz because they had equipped their soldiers with the needle guns.

New possibilities opened up when the first reliable metal cartridges were introduced in the American Civil War and black powder was replaced by the smokeless nitro-powder. The magazine rifle became accepted—foremost among the various models that of the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser. German soldiers fought two world wars using Paul Mauser's famous Model 98 and its follow-on models. With more than 100 million sold, the rifle became a world best seller.

The next step was a semi-automatic, self-loading rifle, first introduced by the U.S. Army in 1936. The rifleman merely had to pull the trigger. The Germans, for their part, invented the first fully automatic rifle—the relatively lightweight, compact Automatic Rifle 44 which fired short cartridges with modified propellants. It was the technical precursor of modern automatic weapons such as the Soviet AK 47, the "Kalashnikov." All these types have their limitations because of the recoil problem.

The firm of Heckler & Koch, which now has developed the new automatic sub-caliber rifle G 11, was founded in 1949 by three former Mauser engineers. At first, the firm concentrated on the production of high-quality sewing machine parts. Then, in the sixties, H & K conquered the military market with the G 3 NATO rifle.

In bidding for the DM 20 million Bundeswehr contract for development of the G 11, the firm managed to beat out two strong competitors. Mauser had proposed a rifle with three barrels all of which were to fire simultaneously. The Diehl group of Roethenbach offered a rifle with separate magazines for projectiles and propellants.

Despite the fact that it is a subcaliber bullet the G 11 projectile is one of the most destructive on record. Even at a distance of 600 meters, it is still capable of penetrating steel helmets and bulletproof vests although the notably long and pointed projectile was developed for use at combat distances of up to 300 meters, "since the required operational ranges are getting smaller all the time," as Moeller says.

But it is the main objective of the G 11 projectile to effect "all kinds of injuries" of "soft targets." "A wounded opponent," Moeller says, "still ties down more manpower on the other side than a dead one."

9478
CSO: 3103/458

ARMY SPARE PARTS SUPPLY PROBLEMS AIRED

PM131511 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 7 May 82 p 1

[Unnamed "Our Correspondent" report: "Concern in Army Over State of Materiel"]

[Text] The Hague, 7 May--The Dutch Army is struggling with serious materiel problems greatly affecting the total mobilization capacity of essential forces. Arie Van Twigt, chairman of the Association of Military Technical and Specialist Staff (VMTB), made this criticism this morning at a general meeting of the association in Ede.

Brigadier General G.C. Berkhof, deputy chief of army staff, said this morning: "This criticism is in part true, but also exaggerated in part."

According to Van Twigt there are situations in which the mobilization capacity of army materiel is really less than half normal capacity. Waiting times for spare parts are becoming longer, he said, and if there was no "black market" circulation of parts the whole of the armed forces would have come to a standstill long ago.

According to the VMTB chairman there is an illegal system for providing spare parts built up from excess supply requests and hidden away in more or less concealed caches. There is also a "gray market" circulation. "Without the knowledge of top officers, through a system of favors and return favors between units, necessary pieces of equipment, sometimes in large numbers, are supplied to those who need them most."

Gen Berkhof did not deny the existence of a "gray market" circulation, although it is not as serious as depicted, he said. "In connection with spending cuts we have had to tighten up on spare parts. If a shortage occurs a great deal of searching goes on. Every soldier, every group has probably a "swap box." And there will be exchanges with neighbors. But this does not keep us awake at nights."

According to Berkhof the problem has arisen partly from the replacement of old equipment by new. Old vehicles, for example, are prone to growing numbers of breakdowns and because they are being replaced by new vehicles no new parts are bought for them. Also there is always the question of running-in problems with the new materiel, Berkhof said.

CSO: 3105/177

ISTAT PREDICTS 'ZERO GROWTH' IN POPULATION

Milan IL GIORNO in Italian 7 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by Luigi Dall'Aglia: "The Future in Italy Has White Hair"]

[Text] In 2001 we shall be more or less the same as we are today. Youth unemployment will be a marginal phenomenon. The school system will be reduced since the "class" of young people from 0 to 14 years will have declined to 16.87 percent. However, the group of "sunset-age" persons will increase to 16.16 percent.

Storks are not going to start flying again. A demographic reawakening is by no means as likely as had been believed. In 2001, the year of the "Space Odyssey," when the Third World, with deadly fertility, will have further overpopulated the globe, we shall be more or less as we are now in Italy: 56.5 million persons, or a little more. ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] has made "reasoned projections" and has concluded that even new couples say "enough" after they have brought barely one child into the world. Our future certainly involves zero population growth, with all its consequences, both positive and negative. Beginning in 1990 youth unemployment will be a truly marginal phenomenon. But we shall have to allocate more resources to health services and pensions: 16.16 percent of the population will be over 65. (Today the over-65's amount to barely 13 percent of the population.) The aging will be much more evident in the north and in the center, where what is euphemistically called the "sunset years" group will include almost 20 Italians in 100.

Therefore, were the alarms of a demographic rebound, sounded 1 year ago by a few authoritative experts (such as professor Golini, teacher of population science at the University of Rome) illusory? ISTAT does not rule out a very modest population upswing in the center-north areas, but it would be a practically irrelevant fact. The only hypothesis considered valid, among the various ones on which the institute based its studies, involves a low birth rate combined with a residual internal migratory movement. "Zero growth" as a national average means a net loss of population for northern Italy, where even today each family has at the most one child, as against two children in southern families. Around the year 2000, according to ISTAT forecasts, northern Italy will show 126,000 fewer births per year than today. The south and the islands will show a demographic increase, but only by 38,000

units with respect to 1981. The Italy of 2001 will be a country of low fertility (1.3 children per woman; in 1981, 1.66); with much-reduced migrations from south to north; and the mortality indices will be the same as those for today. (ISTAT seems to contradict this by affirming that the average life-span of a man increases by 3 years every 10 years.)

ISTAT projections confirm the need to dismantle a part of the existing educational and school system. In 1981 the class from 0 to 14 years exceeded 20 percent of the population. In 20 years it will barely reach 16.87 percent, and in northern Italy it will not even reach that figure. However, ISTAT noted that the spread of birth control techniques will also gradually induce southern couples to eliminate the so-called "undesired fertility." For that reason Italy, in the years to come, should tend toward a greater homogeneity, including the demographic field. The large southern family with its cluster of young children seems to be relegated to the museum of "the way we were."

ISTAT Tables on the Italian Population
(in thousands)

	<u>1971</u> <u>Census</u>	<u>1981</u> <u>Census</u>	<u>1/1/2001</u> <u>Forecasts</u>
Italy	54,137	56,244	56,698
Northern Italy	24,964	25,608	25,693
Central Italy	10,299	10,755	10,854
Southern Italy and islands	18,874	19,881	20,151

Population Percentage from 0 to 14 Years

Italy	24.3	21.171	16.87
Northern Italy	21.96	19.43	14.43
Central Italy	22.38	19.79	15.50
Southern Italy and islands	28.82	25.63	20.25

Population Percentage over 65 Years

Italy	11.28	13.55	16.16
Northern Italy	12.11	14.73	17.04
Central Italy	11.63	14.38	18.14
Southern Italy and islands	9.97	11.60	13.53

9772

CSO: 3104/177

Population of Northern Italy
(in thousands of units)

	(Censuses)				(Estimates)		
	1951	1961	1971	1981	1986	1996	2001
Piedmont	3,158	3,914	4,432	4,538	4,401.6	4,204.4	4,091.4
Val d'Aosta	94.2	101	109	8,114 [sic]	111.1	106.2	103.3
Lombardy	6,566.1	7,406	8,543.4	8,929.7	8,896.7	8,729	8,587.3
Trentino-	728.6	786	841	874	869.9	863.2	855.2
Alto Adige							
Vento	3,918.1	3,846.6	4,132.4	4,338	4,326	4,263	4,208
Friuli	1,226	1,204	1,213	1,245.6	1,197	1,119	1,079
Venezia-							
Giuliana							
Liguria	1,570	1,735	1,853	1,853	1,743	1,602	1,526
Emilia Romagna	3,544	3,666	3,846	3,963.2	3,849	3,620	3,487

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